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Urbanisation and Fiscal Risks in China 
Abstract 
China has witnessed rapid urbanisation over the past three decades. It has been generally 
successful in mobilising resources and providing the infrastructure that cities need to grow their 
economies. The central government has played a major role in China’s urbanisation through 
setting the overall development direction, land granting, and policy formulation. However, the 
responsibilities of infrastructure financing have been gradually shifted to local governments, 
and consequently, local budgetary systems face substantial funding challenges. While the 
decentralised structure of Chinese politics provides strong incentives for local officials to take 
the lead in urbanising China, fiscal institutions place heavy financial burdens on local 
governments. This thesis studies two major problems that arose from China’s urbanisation 
process. In terms of theoretical contribution, the thesis both advances the theories of Chinese 
style fiscal federalism and provides new evidence to enhance its explaining power.  
The first study is on China’s infrastructure financing and local government debt. It finds that 
local government debt for infrastructure is positively affected by the land demand from the 
private sector. Furthermore, land finance is positively related to the level of local government 
debt. The results reveal that the visible hand of local governments works creatively to meet 
infrastructure development targets handed down by the ‘iron hand’ of the central government.  
The second study is on local government financing vehicles’ (LGFVs) borrowing costs and 
land finance. It finds that local governments with higher land leasing revenue could bring down 
the borrowing costs of local LGFVs, while a higher ratio of land revenue to fiscal revenue 
would raise LGFVs’ borrowing costs. A booming local land market would push up the value 
of land assets held by LGFVs and therefore strengthen its ‘collateral channel’, enabling LGFVs 
to borrow at a lower cost. The thesis’ findings can help investors better identify the risks 
associated with LGFV bonds and enable local government borrowing at a lower cost.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
The recent history of China has been dominated by massive urbanisation. As of 2020, more 
than 60% of the total population lived in cities, compared with only 17.9% in 1978. China’s 
urbanisation is pro-growth, with resources being mobilised and geared towards building 
infrastructure (buildings, roads, and industrial and post-industrial services like public utilities). 
This large-scale investment in infrastructure promotes agglomeration in settlement patterns and 
makes domestic demand the engine of growth. Two key drivers of China’s urbanisation have 
been fiscal decentralisation to local governments and a GDP-based performance evaluation 
system, which has seen funds awarded from the centre on the basis of economic measures of 
development. These two institutional arrangements have encouraged experimentation locally, 
setting up competition between cities for resources. In turn, this competition has stoked local 
initiatives in appraising local leaders’ success against national development goals. 
Land is the main source of payment for China’s urbanisation. The combination of China’s 
system of land tenure and its public finance system, including local governments’ cheap access 
to land, monopoly power in land supply, and unbalanced revenue and expenditure assignments, 
strongly incentivises local governments to generate local revenue from land sales. While 
revenue from land sales provides a big part of their revenues, local governments also heavily 
rely on debt backed by future land sales, which are offered through local government financing 
vehicles (LGFVs) to circumvent restrictions on their borrowing. These practices have 
contributed to the unsustainable financing of growth in cities, growing fiscal risk, unsound 
urban growth, and corruption in land sales. 
This thesis carried out two studies. The first answers the call for further research into 
infrastructure financing. It develops a theoretical model to investigate the complex relationship 
between the issuance of local government debt for infrastructure financing, land finance, and 
land demand from the private sector in China. Using LGFVs’ accounting data, I find that the 
'visible hand' of local governments works creatively to meet infrastructure development targets 
handed down by the ‘iron hand’ of the central government. Further, local governments are 
more effective when they consider private sector activity in their debt issuance decisions. By 
studying the two sources of finance in a unified framework, this thesis provides reliable and 
practical evidence of how infrastructure financing works in China.  
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Rapid urbanisation and its huge financing demands drive up the size of China’s local 
government debt. According to the Bank for International Settlements, China’s debt to GDP 
ratio reached 257% in 20171, higher than the United States’ 152% and more than that of most 
emerging economies. In terms of debt growth, McKinsey (2015)2 estimated that China’s total 
debt grew from US$2.1 trillion to US$28.2 trillion between 2000 and 2014, an increase of 
US$26.1 trillion, greater than the GDP of the US, Japan, and Germany combined. China’s total 
per capita debt to per capita annual income ratio is 11.5, far larger than that of US (7.5) and 
Brazil (8.1), and in line with that of Greece (11.8) (Ansar et al. 2016).  
This magnitude of China’s local government debt has attracted the concern of both academia 
and international organisations. The economist Paul Krugman 3  warned that China’s 
unsustainable level of investment is driven by a dangerous level domestic debt. IMF’s recent 
financial stability report (issued by the end of 2017) also suggested that the volume of China’s 
local government debt is on a dangerous trajectory according to the international experience. 
The report said ‘the rapid increase of corporate debt (most of which were issued by Chinese 
sub-national government’s off-budget companies) in China needs to be properly analysed, 
which has increased the complexity of the financial system and endangered financial 
stability’. 4  International rating agencies like Moody 5  and S&P 6  also take stock of the 
accumulating risks associated with mounting debt, downgrading China’s sovereign rating from 
Aa3 to A1 and from A+ to AA- respectively, and changing their outlooks from stable to 
negative. All these warnings show that China’s debt problem is serious, urgent, and deserving 
of systematic study.  
The second study is on the relationship between the Chinese land market and LGFVs’ 
borrowing costs. While the vigour of local land markets is an important factor in determining 
LGFV bond yields, the specific mechanism of how land finance affects LGFVs’ borrowing 
costs is not fully understood. Using LGFV bond data and city-level land market data between 
2011 and 2019, I find a negative relationship between local governments’ land leasing revenue 
and LGFVs’ borrowing costs, and a positive relationship between local governments’ reliance 
 








on land leasing revenue and their LGFV bond yields. A negative relationship holds when land 
assets can be held as collateral for financing growth: when local land prices are high, LGFVs’ 
borrowing costs fall on account of the appreciation of the underlying collateral. This study 
demonstrates hitherto unacknowledged determinants of LGFVs’ borrowing costs. Its policy 
implications should guide local governments in reducing their borrowing costs and steering 
investments away from risky and wrongly priced development. Specifically, the findings 
should enable bond investors to identify the default risks in LGFV bonds.  
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents general background 
information and introduces the literature dealing with China’s urbanisation. I systematically 
review the institutional arrangements for the country’s system of land tenure, local and central 
taxation, and the political relationships between central and local governments. Chapter 3 
presents the thesis’ theoretical framework. It introduces two competing theories of how local 
government officials are motivated to behave before critically evaluating these frameworks. 
Chapter 4 explores local governments’ use of LGFVs to finance infrastructure. Chapter 5 
examines the effect of land finance on LGFVs’ borrowing costs. Chapter 6 examines how local 
corruption leads to higher borrowing costs for firms. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.  
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Chapter 2  
Background Information and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Overview 
This chapter provides background information about China and conducts a general literature 
review. China has urbanised on the basis of intertwined arrangements and institutions for land 
tenure, tax, and political control, and through the instruments and incentives framed by those 
arrangements. By presenting and analysing these institutional forms and their problems, this 
chapter builds an analytical foundation for its theoretical framework in Chapter 3 and the three 
inter-connected papers from Chapter 4 to Chapter 6.   
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2.1 traces China’s progress in urbanisation and 
provides an account of its driving forces. Section 2.2.2 describes China’s institutional forms 
for land tenure and the different roles the central and local governments play in the land market. 
Section 2.2.3 discusses the fiscal institutions, explaining how LGFVs have been able to develop 
so fast in the last two decades. Section 2.2.4 introduces the volume and structure of China’s 
local government debt and its associated applications. Section 2.2.5 describes China’s political 
system and the associations between corruption and land. Concluding the chapter, Section 2.3 
identifies three research questions arising from the specifics of China’s urbanisation.  
2.2 Background Information and General Literature  
2.2.1 China’s Urbanisation: Its Driving Forces 
Urbanisation in China 
Since the 1980s, China has experienced rapid urbanisation characterised by large migration 
from rural to urban areas, the rapid expansion of cities and construction of new city districts 
(Zheng et al. 2014). For example, by 2019, 60% of China’s population lived in cities, compared 
with only 17.9% in 19787 . From 1984 to 2019, the area of land under urban construction 
 
7 China Statistical Year Book, 2020, National Bureau of Statistics of China (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2020/indexch.htm) 
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increased from 8,842 km2 to 60,312.45 km2, an annual growth rate of 16.63%. The country had 
653 large cities in 2010, up from 69 in 1947 and 223 in 1980; it had 100 cities with one 
million population or more, versus 37 in the United States and 32 in India (Hamnett 2020). 
Figure 2.1 shows that the share of China’s total population living in cities has increased steadily 
from less than 20% in 1978 to 60.3% in 2019, amounting to an increase of more than 600 
million people. However, the annual urban population growth rate shows a different pattern. 
Due to the ‘Cultural Revolution’ between 1966 and 1976 and the ‘Up to the Mountains and 
Down to the Countryside Movement Policy’ or ‘Sent-Down Policy’ between the 1960s and 
1970s, more than 17 million young city residents were forced to live in rural areas for up to 12 
years (Honig & Zhao 2015). Between 1978 and 1982, the ‘reform and opening up policy’ led 
to a dramatic rise in the annual growth rate of the urban population, which increased from 
around 1% to above 5%. After 1982, this figure began to fall, roughly settling at 2.29% in 2019. 
However, this rate (in part a measure of countryside-to-city migration) is still significantly 
higher than the world’s average year-on-year urban population growth rate of 1.88%.  
Figure 2.1 The Growth of China’s urban population (in percentage terms), 1960-2020 
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Although China’s urbanisation is unprecedented in brute terms, the increase in its urbanisation 
rate is not an outlier when compared to that of other countries (Figure 2.2). In fact, the change 
in China’s urbanisation rate has been lower than that of Japan and South Korea at comparable 
stages of their development, though higher than that of the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Moreover, despite rapid urbanisation, the share of the urban population has broadly 
kept pace with expectations given China’s per capita income.  
Figure 2.2 China’s urbanisation compared with its international rivals 
 
Note: It should be noted that the urbanisation rates on which this figure is based are not fully comparable, as definitions of 
urban areas differ from country to country. Source: World Bank staff calculations based on World Development Indicators 




Figure 2.3 shows trends in the size of the urban population and extent of built-up areas in China. 
China’s rate of urban construction has outstripped its demographic urban population growth. 
The coefficient of elasticity for urban land (the rate of increase in the area of land under urban 
construction, divided by the rate of urban population increase) is 1.85 for the period from 2000 
to 2010. While this figure dropped marginally to 1.73 for the period between 2010 to 2019, the 
growth of China’s urban areas remains about twice as fast as the growth in the country’s urban 
population. The area of cities at the prefectural level (i.e. cities equivalent to large regional 
municipalities in the West) expanded by 70.1% between 2001 and 2007, whereas the associated 
population swelled by no more than 30% (Gao, 2011)8. Not surprisingly, Fernando (2010) 
reports an estimated around 64 million vacant apartments in China, space in buildings that 
could have housed as much as 15% of China’s 2009 population9. This is a warning sign of 
over-urbanisation, the consequence of over-land-conversion by local governments. Their 
control of land use would seem to be a distorted market mechanism, giving rise to the 
phenomenon of an over-supply of ‘ghost towns’ (Zheng et al. 2014) and to development zone 
‘fever’ (Zhang 2011; Herlevi 2017). More importantly, the increasing number of land disputes 
between local governments and rural farmers (Wu & Heerink 2016) has provoked social unrest 
(Meligrana et al. 2011) and an erosion of trust between villagers and local authorities (Cui et 
al. 2015). This urbanisation model is not sustainable, neither economically nor politically 
(Zheng et al. 2014). 
 
8 Gao, Y., Urbanization appears to be a great leap forward (in Chinese), 2011,  (http://society.people.com.cn/GB/1063/13909007.html) 





Figure 2.3 The trends of urban population and built-up area, 1997-2019 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
The Driving Forces of Urbanisation  
Scholars have understood urbanisation in China in different ways. Urbanisation has been 
associated with industrialisation, population or economic growth, and the upward trend in 
personal income (Deng et al. 2008, 2010). For example, Deng et al. (2008) find that urban land 
tends to expand by 3% when China’s economy, measured by gross domestic product, grows 
10%. Scholars have also found that demographic urbanisation in China has facilitated urban 
land expansion, though it has not been a ‘proactive determinant’ (Ma 2002; Deng et al. 2020).  
Recent studies found that China’s rapid urbanisation is not simply the passive outcome of 
economic growth but has been actively pursued by local governments as a means of securing 
revenue. Due to a series of changes in fiscal arrangement between central and local 
governments since 1994, the central government has claimed an increasing share of tax 
revenues, while responsibility for local expenditure has been decentralised. As a result, local 
governments have shifted their efforts from supporting local enterprise to ‘urbanising’ China 
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revenue maximiser’ (Cao et al. 2008; Tao et al. 2010; Ye & Wang 2013); to bridge revenue 
shortfalls, government has grabbed land and seized land-related revenue primarily by three 
means. First, they have achieved forms of lump-sum land revenue from leasing land to 
residential and commercial users. Second, they have set up a sustainable source of taxable 
profits by attracting industrial enterprise to low-prices they have offered (Tao et al. 2010). 
Third, they adopted the debt-land leverage strategy to use land assets as collateral to borrow 
from the financial market through LGFVs.  
However, in determining whether or not ‘devolution of responsibility leads to land finance’, as 
is popularly believed, the empirical evidence is mixed. At a provincial level, Wu et al. (2015b) 
find a significant positive relationship between land premium revenues and a region’s degree 
of fiscal decentralisation (both in terms of revenue and expenditure).Ye and Wang (2013), 
however, find that on the sub-provincial level, no significant relationship holds between 
responsibility for expenditures and an authority’s reliance on land finance. Instead, a significant 
negative relationship obtained between the degree of revenue decentralisation shows how far 
an authority engages in land finance. Then again, Wang and Ye (2016), using a prefectural 
level city data set, would appear to reverse their earlier conclusions in finding a positive 
correlation between the devolution of responsibility and land finance. Other Chinese 
publications, like those of Liu and Wu, find revenue decentralisation has no impact on land 
finance using a prefectural-level city dataset, while expenditure decentralisation does underlie 
cities’ land-based finance. The result is a mixed picture with regard to any claim that ‘fiscal 
arrangements concerning the decentralisation of welfare spending has prompted local 
governments’ reliance on land finance’. 
2.2.2 Forms of Land Tenure: Central-Local Government Relations 
China’s Land Tenure  
China is characterised by a unique dual urban-rural land system, in which the government 
distinguishes urban land owned by the state from rural land owned by village collectives. On 
state-owned land, land use rights can be sold, transferred, and leased in the urban land market, 
and a variety of development activities are permitted. On rural land, however, according to the 
Land Administration Law, regulations favour agricultural use, and development is strictly 
constrained to three major types, namely, residential plots for farmers, land used for public 
facilities, and land used for township or village enterprises.  
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Urban expansion is not only a process of change in land use—converting arable land for non-
agricultural purposes—but also for changes in the ‘status’ of land—converting collectively 
owned land into state-owned land. Status change may only be carried out by local governments, 
since under the Land Administration Law (LAL), only the state can lawfully acquire land 
owned by collectives. Only after such an ownership change can land users, whether 
commercial developers or the local government itself, develop land for industrial, commercial, 
and infrastructural purposes. As a result, the primary land market is dominated by local 
governments as the sole suppliers of land.  
After land status change, or, in other words, requisition, local governments are empowered to 
transfer land leasehold rights to users: for 70 years for residential use, 50 years for industrial 
and mixed uses, and 40 years for commercial uses. The local government has four transaction 
methods for disposing of land rights: xieyi zhuanrang (negotiated sales) and three types of 
auctions—guapai (or two-stage auctions), paimai (English auctions), and zhaobiao (sale by 
sealed bids). Of these, negotiated sales are the most opaque: local governments negotiate one-
on-one with designated purchasers, usually manufacturing companies looking for industrial 
sites. This allows buyers in negotiated sales to leverage a greater measure of bargaining power 
than those in competitive transaction methods like auctions. However, since 2004, the central 
government has introduced a series of laws to ban closed-door negotiations, aiming to make 
the land market more efficient (Zhou et al. 2020; Jiang & Lin 2021).  
Central Government’s Role in Land Market 
With regard to the issue of controlling land use, the Chinese socialist state has been both 
powerful and powerless. It is powerful in the sense that it has, theoretically, what Kornai (1992) 
refers to as 'an undivided power' in making rules (laws, regulations, and policies) to control 
land development. It is also powerless because state rules have not always been effectively 
enforced. Instead, the rules have often been contested, circumvented, and manipulated not only 
by land developers and users but also by state agencies and managers at various local 
administrative levels (Lin & Ho 2005). As succinctly put by Xu (2011), ‘under the supervision 
of the central government, local governments initiate, negotiate, implement, divert, and resist 
reforms, policies, rules, and laws’. 
The scope for this manipulation exists because central and local governments play different 
roles in the market with respect to land use, and as such, intervene in the land market in different 
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capacities. Local governments act as an ‘economic man’ possessing ‘individual rationality’. In 
distributing land in their jurisdiction, their goal is promoting economic growth and increasing 
(maximising) local revenue. In its capacity as a public authority, meanwhile, the central 
government functions as a rational ‘collective’, whose goal is to promote the healthy 
development of the national economy and maximise social welfare. The central government is 
motivated to create a fair land market, and at the same time, allocate land resources rationally. 
These differences lead to divergences between their policy formulation and execution. 
The priority of the central government is food security. However, during urbanisation, large-
scale requisition of land inevitably entails a reduction in land under arable cultivation. 
Simulation results suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in China’s urbanisation rate will 
precipitate a decline of 0.065% of China’s cultivated area and a 0.067% decline in China’s 
agricultural productive capacity (World Bank & DRC 2014). As Figure 2.4 shows, land under 
construction and arable land have changed inversely in their proportions since the late 2008. 
Built land has increased from 3106 × 104 ha to 3957 × 104 ha, an increase of 11.8%, while 
arable land has fallen to 65,706 × 104 ha, a reduction of 64,486 × 104 ha over the period 2003-
2017. This rapid rate of decline in arable land has led to the contradictory phenomenon of a 
‘large population with relatively little arable land’, exacerbating the risks of food insecurity in 
China. To tackle this issue, the State Council of China passed, in 1994, a set of ‘Basic Farmland 
Protection Regulations’, then in 1998, revised the Land Management Law to protect from over-
land conversion. These measures proposed annual quotas to limit the quantity of land each 
administration can convert to urban use. In general, land policy reforms aim to improve land-
use efficiency, enhance land management, and protect farmland. 
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Figure 2.4 Built land and arable land use change in China, 2003-2017 
 
Note: The data are compiled from detailed land use surveys at the county level, provided by the Ministry of Land and resources 
in each province (city) for the period 2003-2017. 
Local Governments’ Role in the Land Market 
Local governments play a central role in China’s land market. During the Mao era, land 
transactions were prohibited, meaning there was no market for land as a product. Under 
communist ideology, land was regarded as the common property of ‘the people’ collectively. 
The ‘opening up’ policies of the 1980s gradually established a land market and land supply 
system. Legally, land ownership was separated from the right to use land. Land ownership 
continues to rest either with the state or village collectives. Developers and enterprises must 
lease land from the government before undertaking construction. China’s land market has 
boomed in the past decade. For example, it is estimated that the hedonic price index of 
residential land grew by about 89% and 48% from 2007 to 2012 in Beijing and Shanghai, 
respectively. The average land price in 2012 was 57%, 24%, and 41% higher than that in 2007 
for residential, industrial, and commercial land parcels, respectively (Qin et al. 2016). On the 
back of escalating land prices (especially for commercial and real estate development in 
premium locations) on the one hand and artificially low compensations (based on the value of 
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developing coastal areas—have reaped ‘windfall profits’ from the state-induced urbanisation 
process: the total land concession revenue increased from around 2,819.77 billion yuan in 2008 
to around 7,067.93 billion yuan in 2019 (see Figure 2.5). 
Local governments wear ‘four hats’ in the land market and urbanisation in general. The first 
role is as the de facto owners of urban land. According to the Land Management Law, 
ownership of land rests with the state; and only the state has the right to expropriate rural land 
for urban use. However, the concept of the ‘state’ should be understood in such a way as 
observes a separation between central and local governments. Central government exercises 
authority over land approval, while enforcement rights over the use of land are the concern of 
local governments. Central government has the authority to approve the annual land use plan 
proposed by each provincial government. It is also responsible for the approval of agricultural 
land use, land acquisitions, and for supervising the rehabilitation of land under cultivation. In 
general, it controls the total land supply. Local governments at the county or city level are 
mainly responsible for issuing land ownership certificates. At the same time, they also exercise 
land acquisition rights and determine land planning. In sum, although the central government 
has the power to approve plans for land use, local governments wield an executive right to 
convert, expropriate, and issue certificates for land.  
The second role is as the monopoly supplier in the urban land market. All developers and 
enterprises needing urban land have to purchase land use rights from local governments. In this 
process, local governments have the right to choose how they sell land (through xieyi 
zhuanrang, guapai, paimai, or zhaobiao). Differences in land sale methods lead to disparity in 
land prices, especially between types of use (commercial, residential, and industrial).  
The third role is as the biggest beneficiary of the sale of land. Figure 4 shows that the land 
leasing revenue became a major source for government’s fiscal income. Between 2010 and 
2019, the share of land leasing revenue accounted for around 30% of the total government’s 
fiscal income. The cost of land conversion was low, while the benefits of re-zoning can be 
massive. China’s Land Administration Law stipulates that total compensation fees for land 
should not exceed 30 times the average annual value of the product generated from land within 
three years of the conversion. Compensation costs include land compensation, a subsidy for 
resettlement and payments for ground attachments and young crops. In practice, the land 
compensation fee is usually six to ten times the average output value of the first three years of 
cultivated land. The resettlement subsidy of the agricultural population comes in at four to six 
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times the average output value of cultivated land over the last three years, and the other 
subsidies are determined on a discretionary basis by local governments. Under the current land 
transfer system however, local governments can receive a lump-sum income for leasing the 
rights of land use for a 40-70-year period based on current market prices. Under the heading of 
‘deferred land income’, they will receive both exclusive local taxes, such as land value added-, 
cultivated land occupation tax, property tax, urban land use tax, deed tax, stamp duty and city 
maintenance and construction tax, and also assorted charges for land transfer. All these forms 
of income are retained by local governments and will be channelled through an extra-budgetary 
account or off-balance sheet vehicle. In terms of revenue distribution, although the ownership 
of land belongs to the state, central government does not claim a share of land revenue, leaving 
all land proceeds with local governments. Further, local governments have absolute control 
over the use and distribution of land benefit rights. 
Figure 2.5 The share of land leasing revenue to total fiscal revenue, 2010-2019 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
The fourth role is as the agency implementing the policies of the central government 
concerning land. Faced with central initiatives, one could posit that local governments spend 
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land, for example, the central government initiated a series of regulations limiting the loss of 
farmland, including compensation schemes for arable land. However, in practice, the occupied 
arable land is always more productive and larger than supplementary arable land, which 
indirectly leads to a reduction in the arable land area. This problem shows that the principle of 
maintaining the productivity of stock of arable land is not protected. What happens instead is 
more in line with Xu (2011)’s interpretation: ‘subnational governments run the bulk of the 
economy; and they initiate, negotiate, implement, divert, and resist reforms, policies, rules, and 
laws’. 
2.2.3 China’s Fiscal Institution and the Rise of LGFVs   
China’s Fiscal Institution and the Effects of The Soft Budget Constraints Since 2008 
The explosive growth in the amount of local debt is usually attributed to China’s four trillion 
fiscal stimulus. The Chinese economy was badly hit by the global financial crisis, with the 
GDP growth rate falling from 13.9% in 2007 to 7.1% in the quarter of 2008. To shield the post-
crisis domestic economy from a slump in foreign demand, China’s central government 
proposed a counter-cyclical fiscal plan worth four trillion yuan (US$568 billion) in November 
2008. This plan was initiated by the central government but mainly implemented by local 
governments, mostly through a series of fiscal relaxations and round of financial deregulation. 
However, financial deregulation alone cannot fully explain such a rapid increase in debt 
volume. Rather, China’s local debt problem stems from its unique institutional arrangements.   
First, the 1994 system of tax sharing transfers the bulk of locally collected tax revenues to the 
centre, leaving local governments with heavy fiscal shortfalls. For example, local governments 
retained only 47.6% of national revenue but represented 79.9% of national expenditure in 2009 
(Shen et al. 2014). Another study over a longer period found that local governments received 
about 40% of national government revenues, while accounting for more than 60% of national 
government expenditure (Fan & Lv 2012). Figure 2.6 shows that in recent years, the ratio of 
expenditure of local governments to total government revenue is above 80%, while the share 
of revenue to the total is marginally above 50%. This tax change, together with a cadre 
evolution system, that is, a promotion system for Communist Party officials that ties 
individuals’ careers to local GDP growth provides strong incentives for local governments to 
actively search out extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenue (Ong 2012).  
  
 17 
Figure 2.6 Fiscal revenue and expenditure of local governments, 1978-2020 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Second, the 1994 Budget Law prohibited local governments from issuing debt and running 
deficits. However, in reality, local governments have numerous ways to work around this law. 
For example, grassroots governments can borrow by setting up collective township and village 
enterprises and pressuring credit institutions into lending to these enterprises (Ong 2012). 
Another way is to use off-balance-sheet companies known as LGFVs to circumvent the law. 
LGFVs’ borrowing does not show on local government balance sheets, meaning governments 
have not violated the law while, in fact, being accountable for a large volume of unobservable, 
off-balance sheet debt. Third, as a result of banking system changes in the late 1990s 
centralising the power to appoint local bank officers, local banks in reality still cannot resist 
mounting pressure from local governments to provide external financing in the wake of the 
tax-sharing reforms. 
Local governments’ budgetary constraints have been eased or rendered ‘softer’ by fiscal and 
financial deregulation. In 2008, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and 
Ministry of Finance issued special regulations encouraging local governments to devise various 
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LGFVs easy access to the financial system. Specifically, of the 4 trillion RMB stimulus 
package, 1.18 trillion RMB (29.5% of the total) was disbursed from the central government, 
while the remaining 2.82 trillion RMB (70.5% of the total package) came from local 
governments as announced by China’s National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC). This large-scale stimulus brought a high volume of investment. The aggregated 
investment rate increased by 5% of GDP between 2009 and 2010, with the investment rate in 
non-residential structures going up from 16% of GDP in 2008 to 18% in 2009 and 20% in 2010 
(Bai et al. 2016). However, the follow-up impact of financial deregulation has been more 
pronounced than its initial shock.  
After the 2009 stimulus, local governments have used LGFVs to circumvent budgetary 
constraints, grow debt, and consequently widen local fiscal gaps (Bai et al. 2016). The number 
of LGFVs surged to 8221 at the end of 2009 from 3000 in the second half of 2008. In 2009 
alone, more than 2000 new LGFVs were established. LGFVs have continued to grow since the 
stimulus program ended in 2010: their spending has accounted for roughly 10% of GDP each 
year. With these vehicles becoming such a major contributor to GDP growth, the central 
government has understood that the rising indebtedness could threaten financial stability, 
without being entirely able to shut down their financing channels (Financial Times10). 
The Structure and Arrangement of LGFVs 
Despite their diversity, LGFVs share a number of features. They are owned and controlled by 
local governments but are economically and legally independent entities. Local governments 
have mapped out their own ‘land-infrastructure-leverage’ strategy for urban development, 
which enables them to hide behind LGFVs and adhere to fiscal transfer rules while avoiding 
local budgetary crises. LGFVs, therefore, are agents of local governments.  
As can be seen from the Figure 2.7, LGFVs serve two main purposes—raising funds by 
borrowing money from banks or issuing debt on the bond markets and undertaking urban 
construction by coordinating specialised companies, many of which are owned or affiliated to 





Figure 2.7 LGFVs structure and arrangement 
 
LGFVs in Land and Financial Markets 
Local governments were not allowed to raise new debt until the Budget Law had been amended 
in 2014. To bypass the law, local governments set up off-balance-sheet companies known as 
LGFVs. Legally, LGFVs are state-owned enterprises set up by local governments for 
infrastructure financing and construction. After the financial crisis in 2008, the central 
government gradually opened the market for private projects, such as commercial and 
residential development, to LGFVs (Bai et al. 2016). To raise liability from banks and bond 
markets, local governments pooled public assets, including land and budgetary funds, and 
injected them into LGFVs to build strong balance sheets. By doing so, LGFVs would be able 
to meet the requirements for bond issuance, such as the minimum total net asset volume and 
the debt-to-equity ratio set by the regulatory department. 
Figure 2.7 displays the roles of LGFVs in Chinese urban development including public and 
private projects. A typical arrangement would see a local government transfer the ownership 
of a plot of land to a LGFV, and then the LGFV would use this land as collateral to borrow 
from banks and shadow banks (trusts) and to issue bonds. The money would be channelled to 
finance construction on the plot of land. After the infrastructure projects are completed, land 
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prices surrounding the core developed area rise and the LGFV can use the land they have set 
aside to bargain with banks for further loans or as a form of repayment of debt.  
In this process, local governments usually support LGFVs by providing guarantees or using 
their influence to pressure local banks to provide loans. One example is the Shanghai Shenhong 
company affiliated to the Shanghai municipal government. The latter transferred Shenhong 
land assets worth 17.26 million yuan and leant on Shanghai-based banks using these assets as 
collateral to offer short-term loans to Shenhong (Jiang & Waley 2018b).  
The first channel for supporting the LGFVs is land allocation, through which the local 
government allocates land to LGFVs for infrastructure construction. The land is transferred to 
LGFVs for free but changing the initial purpose of the land use is strictly forbidden. This is 
because the Land Administration Law stipulates (article 54) that ‘allocated land can only be 
used for infrastructure and for welfare undertakings or governmental and military use’. In 
addition, the law specified that allocated land cannot be transferred, leased, or mortgaged. For 
instance, it is not allowed to sell the land which is allocated to LGFVs to other companies for 
generating revenue or to convert the land from infrastructure purpose to residential or 
commercial development.  
The second channel for supporting the LGFVs is land conveyance, through which the local 
government sells land to LGFVs for profit-oriented projects. In addition to infrastructure 
projects, LGFVs engage in commercial projects, such as residential development and 
commercial real estate, which are essentially private projects (Bai et al. 2016). Like other land 
users, LGFVs have to pay the fee for the land use before the commencement of project 
development. The land is sold via the conveyance of land use right, through tender, auction, or 
listing. Among them, most of the land (77%) was sold by listing, and 21% of land was sold by 
auction (Huang & Du 2018). In addition, LGFVs were found to have overbid on the land 
significantly and thus inflate the land price (Huang & Du 2017).  
There are several avenues for LGFVs to finance both public and private projects. On the one 
hand, revenue stemming from land leasing provides credit to support local infrastructure 
development. Previous studies show that the majority of the land leasing revenue has been 
earmarked by local governments to inject into LGFVs to finance infrastructure directly (Wang 
et al. 2011). However, the land revenue is insufficient to sustain the infrastructure-led 
development in urban areas.  
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On the other hand, LGFVs have borrowed heavily from the financial market. Before 2009, 
more than 90% of LGFVs’ debt were in the form of bank loans (Bai et al. 2016), which were 
worth 5.57 trillion RMB (Pan et al. 2017). Although the average maturity of these loans was 
three to five years, the projects usually lasted decades (Kroeber 2016). Due to the maturity 
mismatch, the borrowing channel shifted from bank loan to bond market since 2013 (Chen et 
al. 2017a). Empirical evidence in Chen and Wen (2017) show that one more dollar of bank 
loans in 2009 leads to about 13 cents more issuance of municipal bond to repay bank loans in 
later years. Local government debt has risen dramatically since 2008. Local government debt 
in China reached 17.89 trillion RMB in 2013 (Wu et al. 2018), which accounted for 31.5% 
GDP of that year. The rapid accumulation of local government debt associated with systematic 
risk has become a prominent concern for the central government. 
2.2.4 Local Government Debt and Land Development 
The Evolution of Local Government Debt Volume and Structure  
In the early stages, institutional and legal barriers made it difficult for the central government 
to obtain real fiscal data from provincial governments (Deng et al. 2013). China’s true level of 
local government debt is unknown (Bo et al. 2017) and this low level of fiscal transparency 
leads to the difficulty in conducting in-depth empirical research (Feng 2013). While quite a 
few empirical works tried to estimate the true level of local government debt (Li & Lin 2011; 
Chang et al. 2013; Ma 2013), the most reliable debt data came from three national-wide 
auditions conducted by the National Audit Office (NAO) in 2010, 2011 and June 2013 (See 
Table 2.1). However, even the official debt level figures could vary significantly according to 
different definitions and coverage.  
Table 2.1. China’s local government debt level between 2010 and 2013 (trillion Yuan) 
Category/Year 2010 2012 2103-6 
Debt that the local government needs to repay 6.7 9.63 10.89 
The overall debt level regardless of category 10.72 15.89 17.89 
Overall debt to GDP ratio 26.69% 30.14% .. 
Note: National Audit Office (NAO) classifies the local government debt into three categories: debt that government needs to 
repay, debt that government guarantees, debt for which government has potential bail-out responsibility. NAO defines the last 
two kinds of debt as local government contingent debt. Here the overall debt level shows the total local debt level including 
all three categories. ‘..’ indicates that the data is unavailable. Source: National Audit Office (NAO)’s 2013 report.  
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Table 2.1 shows the different debt levels according to different categories. In terms of debt that 
governments need to repay, the overall local debt level was 6.7 trillion yuan by the end of 2010, 
which increased to 9.63 trillion in 2012 and to 10.9 trillion in June 2013. However, these figures 
would inflate significantly if I included debt that governments guarantee and debt for which 
governments have potential bail-out responsibility. After adding these, the overall debt level 
would be 10.72 trillion, 15.89 trillion, and 17.89 trillion in 2010, 2012, and 2013, respectively, 
inflated by 37.5%, 40%, and 39%.  
Historically, bank loans were the main contributor to local government debt. A June 2013 
National Audit Office (NAO) report (Figure 2.8) offers an insight into the composition of local 
debts. As the chart shows, there are four major types of liabilities: bank loans, BT (built-to-
transfer), municipal corporate bonds (issued by LGFVs), and trusts, which make up 57%, 8%, 
10%, and 8% of the total debt load respectively in 2013. The recent trend, though, has been for 
their share to decline, and for the share of municipal bonds to increase significantly. As the 
Chinese economy slows down, local governments’ ability to repay has come into question and 
the consequent risks to the banking sector have become a growing concern.  
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Source: NAO (National Audit Office) 2013 report 
To improve debt transparency and prepare, quite possibly, for an upcoming round of 
insolvencies, the State Council introduced a debt-for-bond swap program in March 2015, 
aiming to exchange high-interest local government loans for issues with longer terms and lower 
interest rates. The revised budget law adopted a strategy of ‘opening the front door and closing 
the back door’ in which it tightened local government off-budget borrowing and other 
unregulated sources, while allowing provincial governments to issue their own bonds subject 
to an annual cap determined by the National People’s Congress.  
Figure 2.9 shows the debt level that local governments should repay since 2015, with the figure 
rising from 14.82 trillion in 2015 to 21.31 trillion in 2019. The share of bond to total debt 
outstanding also saw a significant increase from 3% in 2015 to 99% in 2019.  
Figure 2.9 Local government debt and bond outstanding, 2015-2019 
 
Source: China Electronic Local Government Bond Market Database http://www.celma.org.cn/ndsj/index.jhtml 
Local government debt and land development   
A strong connection exists between local government debt and China’s land development. On 
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previous residents. As Table 2.2 clarifies, urban infrastructure-related expenditure accounts for 
the lion’s share of total debt revenue—more than 70%. On the other hand, governments expect 
to repay debt (both to banks and holders of bond issues) from future land-related revenues, as 
these are generated both by rising land prices and the proceeds of land leasing. Table 2.3 shows 
the percentage of debt that is expected to be repaid out of land and land-related revenue: 38% 
in 2010, dropping slightly to 37.23% in 2012. Table 2.4 shows detailed provincial debt-to-land 
revenue ratios in 2013. These ratios show how heavily reliant a region or province is on land-
related revenues to pay off its debts. The ratios for the ten most land-dependent provinces 
average 40%, with the highest—above 65%—accounting for Zhejiang province. Many 
scholars  (Zhang & Barnett 2014; He et al. 2016) and organisations (IMF 2016) worry that if 
land values fall, the value of land-based collateral would also fall, which may pose a threat to 
lenders. 
Table 2.2. The use of debt revenues 
The use of debt revenues Value (trillion yuan) Percentage (%) 
City construction 3.53 36.72 
Transportation 2.39 24.89 
Land buying 1.02 10.62 
Social welfare related 0.92 9.54 
Agricultural and water conservancy construction 0.46 4.77 
Environment protection 0.27 2.84 
Solving local financial risk 0.11 1.15 
Industry input 0.13 1.33 
Energy resources 0.02 0.25 
Other 0.76 7.89 
Total 9.61 100.00 
Source: National Audit Office (2013)’s report 
Table 2.3. Total debt will be repaid by land revenue (billion Yuan) 
Category/Year 2010 2012 
Debt repaid by land related revenue 25473.51 34865.24 
Total debt that governments have responsibility to repay 67109.51 93642.66 
The percentage of land revenue repaid debt to total debt 38% 37.23% 
   Source: National Audit Office (NAO)’s 2013 report 
Another problem is that despite sustained high land prices, asset-based revenue streams may 
no longer be able to cover interest payments in several provinces (something in fact projected 
to happen in 2009, given that Ningxia province, for example, saw its interest payments rise to 
5.56 times its land transfer fees in 2006; see He et al. (2014)). Wu et al. (2016) describe how 
the city of Guangzhou found it hard to sell of parcels of land to repay bank loans and coupons 
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on bonds issued by the LGFVs. The situation has improved this decade due to the sharp rise in 
land prices and related bubble in house prices. However, it is questionable whether high 
housing demand can drive a perpetual rise in land prices. The local state would face substantial 
risks of widespread default if housing and land prices were to decline.   
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Table 2.4. Top ten provinces’ debt repayment reliance on land revenue ratio 
Province 
Overall debt (billion 
yuan) 
Debt promised repaid by 
land revenue (billion yuan) 
Land revenue 
reliance ratio 
Zhejiang 4133.91 2739.44 66.27% 
Tianjin 2171.39 1401.85 64.56% 
Fujian 1864.44 10655.09 57.13% 
Hainan 915.66 519.54 56.74% 
Chongqing 3261.40 1659.81 50.89% 
Beijing 5972.34 3016.27 50.50% 
Jiangxi 2187.79 1022.06 46.72% 
Shanghai 5044.34 2222.65 44.06% 
Hubei 4099．14 1762.17 42.99% 
Sichuan 5314.07 2125.65 40.00% 
Source: National Audit Office (NAO)’s 2013 report 
2.2.5 China’s Political System of Selection and Corruption 
China’s Political Selection System 
China’s cadre management system was copied from the Soviet Union’s nomenklatura and 
bestows ultimate control over local cadres’ political careers on central government, or, rather, 
on the Communist Party. Based on a set of evaluation criteria, the ‘organisation’ departments 
of the Party conduct annual assessments to evaluate local officials, then use positive and 
negative forms of incentives (rewards and threats) to shape local officials’ behaviour. 
Assessments may only be used as a reference, with final decisions being left to party standing 
committees, usually made up of the 11-13 most prestigious and powerful leaders at each 
administrative level, who are charged with the authority to decide who will be promoted and 
who dismissed.  
According to the Civil Servant Law of 2005, the assessment criteria orient themselves with 
regard to a set of multiply interpretable principles: virtue (de 德), competence (neng 能), 
diligence (qin 勤), achievements (ji 绩), and the absence of venality (lian 廉). In practice, 
however, these ambiguous principles tend to express themselves in hard performance targets. 
In general, cadres are rewarded or punished based on how well they hit these targets. While 
some scholars (Su et al. 2012) argue that neither an explicit nor implicit responsibility system 
(TRS) applies to provincial level administration, it is commonly the case that these 
performance-driven evaluations govern the management of county and township government 
and local officials’ careers in these ranks. 
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Performance targets may be divided into three categories based on their criticality to the 
survival of the regime. The most important ones are the so-called ‘imperative targets’ or in 
Chinese yipiao foujue zhibiao (一票否决指标  in Chinese). These are population quotas 
(reflecting the implementation of the ‘one child policy’) and measures of political stability, as 
captured by incidences of large-scale protest. Failing to meet these targets usually means an 
official has sacrificed his (or less usually, her) chances of promotion and any bonuses. They 
may even be demoted. The next level of priority target is characteristically referred to as ‘hard’ 
and usually takes stock of an administrative area’s economic performance in such terms as 
GDP per capita, some measure of the comprehensive benefits of economic development, and 
regional disparities in economic development. Soft targets, meanwhile, usually include how 
assiduous officials have been in conducting propaganda or recruiting party members. Among 
the hard targets, as shown in Table 2.5, in the past two decades, over half the assessments of 
leaders have been conducted in terms of economic targets.  
  
 28 
Table 2.5 National Guidelines for Performance Targets for Local Party and State 
Leaders 
1988 Categories 2006 Categories 2009 Categories 
GNP GDP per capita GDP per capita 
Gross value of industrial output GDP per capita growth rate 
Comprehensive benefits of 
economic development 
Gross value of agricultural 
output 
Local budgetary income per 
capita 
Regional disparity in economic 
development 
Gross value of output of TVEs 
Local budgetary income per 
capita growth rate 
Cost of economic development 
National income per capita Urban income Urban income 
Rural income per capita Urban income growth rate Rural income 





Taxes and profits remitted - 
Fiscal income 
Rural income growth rate Healthcare 
Sales retention 
Resource consumption Nine-




Social safety net Urban 
employment 
Public security 
Grain output Urban and rural cultural activity Urban and rural cultural activity 
Local budgetary income - Local 
budgetary expenditure  
Population and family planning Population and family planning 






Forested area Investment in technology 
Investment in technology and 
innovation 
Nine-year compulsory education 
completion rate 
Environmental protection Environmental protection 
Natural population growth rate   
Note: Each 1988 category was assessed for both level and growth rate. The 1988 guideline was applied to the evaluation of 
leading cadres at the county level, while the 2006 and 2009 guidelines were applied to the evaluation of leading cadres at and 
above the county level. Source: Zuo (2015)’s paper 
Bell and Annual (2017) describe China’s political system as a ‘political meritocracy’, in which 
political leaders are (generally fairly) assessed and chosen according to their competence. Xu 
(2011) describes this system as a 'regionally decentralised authoritarian regime'. On the one 
hand, a nested system of choosing subordinates allows higher-level leaders to decide on the 
criterion of promotion (and demotion). On the other, subnational governments (provinces, 
municipals, and counties) are not only granted a high degree of autonomy over local economic 
activities, but also rights over local resources, such as land, enterprises, financial resources, 
and raw materials. China’s ‘multiregional organisational form’ (or M-form) promises, in theory, 
that higher-level leaders' quality of performance information will be better than in unitary form 
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(U-form) countries (Maskin et al. 2000). The multiregional, broadly hierarchical but still 
involved organisational scheme of Chinese government sets the whole country up as a coherent 
incentive system for local leaders, that is, as a regional tournament competition. As a result, 
local officials are highly motivated to boost their regions’ GDP growth rate, as this may be 
observed by the central government.  
But do officials, in fact, always do this? Chen et al. (2005) find that at a provincial level, each 
official’s performance relative to his or her immediate predecessor significantly affects 
whether they are promoted. Li and Zhou (2005) similarly show that regional officials are 
motivated to promote regional economic growth. Chen et al. (2017) re-examined Li and Zhou 
(2005)’s findings, revealing that promotion decisions are apparently made not just on the basis 
of an official’s improvement (or not) on their predecessors, but based on their relative ranking 
among peers. Shih et al. (2012) and Meyer et al. (2016) challenge the tournament thesis, stating 
that, in post-reform China, factional affiliations continue to play an important role in promoting 
central leaders (from province to the centre). Landry et al. (2018)’s recent work controls for 
political factions and selection bias, continuing to find a positive relationship between officials’ 
economic performance and their promotion prospects at lower governmental levels (from 
county to prefecture), though not at a higher level (from prefecture to province and from 
province to central government).  
Political Corruption in Land and Real Estate Market  
Apart from improving local economic growth, corruption is another shortcut for local officials 
to get promoted. China’s political corruption is most serious in the real estate sector (Zhu 2012). 
Most corruption in the real estate industry occurs during the process of transferring land use 
rights, where both the corrupt officials and bribed firms are mutually beneficiated from this 
process. For example, using the national land transaction data between 2004 and 2016, Chen 
and Kung (2019) reveal that firms having a connection with the Politburo, the highest ruling 
circle of Chinese Communist Party, can obtain the land parcels at 55.4%-55.9% discount 
compared to their non-connected counterparts in the primary land market. In return, those local 
officials who provide discount to princeling firms, are 23.4% more likely to be promoted.  
China’s land tenure rules make for an almost ideal environment to investigate the extent of 
local officials’ corrupt behaviour. It is within the power of local governments to allocate land 
parcels through choosing the auction format and striking preauction side deals between bidders 
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and local officials. Favoured developers in a two-stage auction process could be taken into the 
first round, deterring the entry of other bidders. Empirical evidence shows that land prices 
achieved through two-stage auctions are significantly lower than in English auctions (Cai et al. 
2013). Li (2019) shows that local governments tend to use two-stage auctions for low-value 
land to maximise personal benefits, while reserving English auctions for high-value land to 
drive up the public benefits of the sale.  
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter described the main features of China’s urbanisation as captured by the general 
literature. It demonstrates how local governments are the main drivers, and beneficiaries, of 
the urbanisation process. Both the literature and observations bring to light certain fundamental 
weaknesses in the existing system, which go beyond imposing inefficiency costs to threaten 
basic financial sustainability. This thesis addresses three major problems and research gaps 
associated with China’s urbanisation.  
First, enormous infrastructure investment in China is generally justified by the rapid rate of 
urbanisation and sharp growth of income. It is undeniable, though, even by the advocates of 
breakneck urbanisation, that some infrastructure investments are driven by the distorted 
incentives of government officials. To attract industrial investment and raise more revenue, 
local governments may over-invest in infrastructure to service newly developed tracts of urban 
land. Because land leasing revenue and debt raised through LGFVs are two major sources of 
funding for infrastructure finance, it is important to investigate how these two different funding 
sources are mobilised, and whether local investment in infrastructure can even in theory meet 
real local demand. These questions are addressed in Chapter 4.  
Second, a stable and sustainable system of debt finance is critical to China’s continuing 
urbanisation. Land has played an important role as collateral for borrowing by LGFVs, linking 
the health of local finances to land prices and real estate development. While China’s land 
prices have seen a steady increase over the last three decades, urban land values can be highly 
volatile—and will presumably reach a plateau when the entire country has reached peak 
urbanisation. The basis on which local bonds are issued is that local governments stand behind 
the LGFVs and guarantee their paper value, which means that land price fluctuations have the 
potential to induce instability in local government budgets and threaten local fiscal soundness. 
Given how China’s financial system has provided a huge amount of credit to LGFVs, it is 
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important to investigate their solvency and how their default risks imperil China’s financial 








This chapter sets out the thesis’s theoretical framework. Land use and urbanisation in China 
are central to the country’s emerging political, social, and economic landscape. Urbanisation 
is thus germane to any assessment of China’s development nationally, while the design of 
incentives in encouraging modernisation has proved to be a topic of great interest 
internationally. This chapter first reviews key publications on the theme of how urbanisation 
may be incentivised in China. Then, I critically review two competing theories. Finally, I 
propose this work’s conceptual framework using one preferred theory and suggest how the 
findings presented in the later chapters support the conceptualisation of the prices and risks of 
housing debt. 
Two competing theories describe the incentives offered to local government officials to drive 
urbanisation in China: a Regional Tournament Competition Model (RTC) and a Fiscal 
Federalism (FF) Model. The thesis has collected data and developed methods of analysis to 
verify these theories. Both models have limitations that stem from the complexity of local 
government behaviours in land conversion and urbanisation. Briefly, the chapter finds that the 
Fiscal Federalism (FF) model, overall, provides a better description of the land development 
decisions taken by local government officials. The Federalism Model is also more challenging 
to represent theoretically and substantiate empirically, given the much wider range of factors 
to be considered under this framework. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of urbanisation in China. 
Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 review the two mainstream theories of incentivisation in explaining the 
role of local governments in urban expansion. Section 3.2.3 states the limitations of the two 
theories. Finally, Section 3.3 comes down in favour of one theory, explaining how the findings 
of this thesis back up the fiscal federalism theory, introducing some caveats and putting in 
place a conclusion.    
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3.2 Theories of Local Government Incentives  
3.2.1 The Regional Tournament Competition Model (RTC) 
The first mainstream framework to explain the incentives of local governments to engage in 
urbanisation is the RTC model. Under this framework, local governments actively pursue land 
development as a means of revenue generation to finance local economic growth, and 
consequently, urbanisation has become a vehicle for local governments to attract foreign and 
domestic capital, strengthen place competitiveness, and enhance the political as well as 
financial gains of individual cadres (Lin & Yi 2011; Lin et al. 2015). The motivation behind 
their efforts stems from the build-in mechanism of RTC for economic growth, which provides 
incentives through appointment and promotion within the hierarchical structure through 
various channels, measured by its unique relative performance evaluation system (Xu 2011).  
When a region has a higher growth rate than others, the head of the region will be more likely 
to be promoted (Xu 2011). This leads to the assumption underlying many studies that the 
central government makes promotion or turnover decisions based on a performance score of 
these leaders. Chen et al. (2005) find that each official’s performance relative to his/her 
immediate predecessor does have a significant impact on promotion. Li and Zhou (2005) 
similarly show that regional officials were indeed strongly motivated to promote regional 
economic growth.  
Land, as an important resource controlled by the officials, played an active role in the local 
officials’ behaviour. He et al. (2016) find that the interregional competition among officials for 
better economic performance inspired local governments to employ land development to 
mobilise more capital investment for growth. Scholars find that land revenue may directly 
contribute to the local official’s promotion probability (Cai 2004; Guo 2009; Yew 2011; Chen 
& Kung 2016; Chen & Kung 2019). As a result, the RTC framework underpins many existing 
studies to understand the role of land in promoting economic growth in China.  
First, land is modelled as an important factor of production, not only for agriculture but also 
for manufacturing industries and services. Ding and Lichtenberg (2011) introduce land into an 
urban GDP growth model and confirm the importance of land availability. Viewing growth as 
a function of technology, labour, land, and capital, Li (2014) finds that public land auction 
increases land price and thus has a positive impact on economic growth. Other scholars also 
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empirically confirm the positive impacts of land leasing (Liu et al. 2008) and industrial land 
expansion (He et al. 2014) on economic growth (GDP).  
Second, the revenue generated from leasing land use rights has become a vital source of capital 
for urban infrastructure (Wang et al. 2011; Ding et al. 2014; Zhong et al. 2019).Ding et al. 
(2014) find that local governments would channel land revenue more towards growth 
orientated infrastructure such as urban road and or image public impression of local economic 
success. Fan et al. (2016) find that land development exerts a positive influence on urban 
economic growth through public infrastructure. Land revenue has also been successfully used 
as a tool to sustain infrastructure investment and then to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), 
triggering urban economic growth indirectly (He et al. 2014).  
Third, local governments have used land as a strategic tool to attract FDI to promote local 
economic growth by leasing land through negotiation at a very low price (Cao et al. 2008; Liu 
et al. 2008; Huang & Du 2017). Local governments strived to attract industrial investors 
through this ‘race to the bottom’ in land leasing price (Lin & Ho 2005; Liu et al. 2008; Tao et 
al. 2010; Ding & Lichtenberg 2011; He et al. 2014; Huang & Du 2017). Legally, local 
governments are de facto owners of land and can reap low-cost land from local farmers under 
the current land requisition system (Lin & Ho 2005; Ding 2007; Cao et al. 2008) as well as 
lease out land through non-market mechanisms with low prices (Liu et al. 2016b).  
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Table 3.1 Summary of Papers Using RTC Model 
Author Sample size Sampling period Statistical method 
Liu, et al. (2008) Provincial level data 1998-2005 Panel data analysis 
He et al. 2014 Prefectural level data 2004-2008 SEM analysis 
Li (2014) Provincial level data 2000-2009 
Fixed effect panel data 
analysis 
Fan et al. (2016) Prefectural level cities data 1999-2012 
Mediating effects analysis 
method 
Guo (2009) County level data 1997-2002 
Fixed effect panel data 
analysis 
Ding et al. (2014) Prefectural level cities data 1999-2006 
Fixed effect panel data 
analysis 
Liu et al. (2016a) Prefectural level data 1999-2010 2SLS method 
Chen and Kung 
(2016) 
County level data 1999-2008 
2SLS, Linear probability 
model, Ordered logit model 
Huang and Du 
(2017) 
Prefectural level data 2003-2012 Spatial panel data model 
3.2.2 The Fiscal Federalism Model (FF) 
Different from the tournament competition model, the FF framework regards local 
governments as fiscal revenue maximisers (Jin et al. 2005). In this strand of literature, both 
political competition and fiscal incentives are considered as the motivation of local 
governments to promote urbanisation in China (Lichtenberg & Ding 2009; Tao et al. 2010; Lu 
& Landry 2014; Han & Kung 2015; He et al. 2016). However, the competition does not mean 
‘tournament’, but ‘horizontal or regional competition’ (Su et al. 2012; Su & Tao 2017).  
According to the ‘market-preserving federalism’ theory proposed by Montinola et al. (1995a); 
Jin et al. (2005), local governments will promote economic growth if three conditions can be 
met. First, whether a fiscal contracting system between central and local governments can 
deliver local policies that promote local enterprises and market development. Second, under a 
given fiscal contracting system, whether a more prosperous local economy enables local 
governments to collect more revenues for local spending. Third, a ‘hard budget constraint’ 
holds for local governments, placing the onus of solving financial problems on local 
governments and cutting out the potential bailout from the central government. The ‘fiscal 
contracting system’ implemented in the 1980s met these two conditions by allowing local 
governments to keep the surpluses after fixed submissions to the centre (Oi 1992; Montinola 
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et al. 1995b) and by ceasing to guarantee upper-level budget allocations to meet local 
expenditures (Kung 2013). In other words, local governments had to rely primarily on revenues 
created within their own jurisdictions. They were granted control rights over both revenues and 
profits generated by these endeavours. An important part of the revenue came from the 
development of non-farm enterprises (Qian & Xu 1993; Jin et al. 2005; Cao et al. 2008; Kung 
2013)  
In 1994, the tax-sharing reform initiated a series of fiscal reforms that enabled the central 
government to receive the bulk of the tax revenue but left sub-national governments 
responsible for public services provision and financing. It shifted local governments’ efforts 
from promoting local enterprises to ‘urbanising’ China (Han & Kung 2015). Local 
governments retained about 40% of national revenue but contributed well over 60% of national 
expenditure (Fan & Lv 2012; Shen et al. 2014). As a result, the fiscal gap in local level 
government’s budget continued to widen (Jia et al. 2014). Subsequently, the central 
government began to levy a 50% enterprise profit tax (increased to 60% in 2003) since 2002. 
This effectively discourages local governments from improving enterprise efficiency 
regardless of ownership. Meanwhile, the central state has not proposed to share with local 
governments the business tax, which consists primarily of taxes levied upon the construction 
and real estate industry. This transition led local governments to pursue land transferring fees 
as one of the major revenues, referred to as ‘land finance’ (Cao et al. 2008; Ye & Wang 2013; 
Han & Kung 2015; Wu et al. 2015b; Zhong et al. 2019). Land finance results in a rapid urban 
expansion in China (Tao et al. 2010; Yew 2011; He et al. 2014; Ye & Wu 2014). Moreover, 
the rate of urban spatial expansion is higher in areas where land conversion is more profitable 
(Ding & Lichtenberg 2011).  
The FF model helps better understand the motivation behind local governments’ urbanisation 
strategies. For example, the land leasing strategy adopted by a local government depends on 
its fiscal conditions. Pan et al. (2015) find that those local governments with lower fiscal deficit 
to GDP ratio tend to lease land to residential or commercial real estate developers, while those 
local governments with higher fiscal deficit to GDP ratio favour industrial development. Huang 
and Du (2017) find that as local governments place more weight on land-leasing revenue, they 
lease out less industrial land, at a lower price, and more residential land at a higher price. This 
is because residential and commercial development generate significant initial tax revenue, but 
industrial development provides a more sustainable model of revenue growth (Cao et al. 2008; 
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Tao et al. 2010; Su et al. 2012). The theory also underpins local governments’ land hoarding 
behaviours. By strategically limiting land supply or hoarding land for commercial and 
residential development in their jurisdictions, local governments can ensure that land and 
property prices continue to rise (Wu 2010; Du & Peiser 2014). 
Table 3.2 Summary of Papers Using FF Model 
Author Sample size Sampling period Statistical method 
Ran Tao et al. (2010) 
Prefectural level 
cities data 
1999-2003 Panel data analysis 




2SLS, Fixed effect & 
Random effect panel data 
analysis 
Ye and Wang (2013) Provincial level data 1999-2009 
Fixed effect panel data 
analysis 
He et al. (2014) Prefectural level data 2002-2008 
SLM and SEM spatial 
regression models 
Linchtenberg and Ding (2009) 
Coastal region 
provinces data 
1996-2004 Panel data analysis 
Pan et al. (2015) Provincial level data 1999-2010 PSTR model 
Qun et al. (2015) Provincial level data 1999-2008 SYS-GMM estimator 
Han and Kung (2015) Prefecture-level data 1999-2005 
OLS and SIV (simulated 
instrumental variable) 
Du and Periser (2014) Provincial level data 1995-2010 CUE-GMM estimator 
3.2.3 A Critical Evaluation of the Two Frameworks 
The RTC framework is mainly criticised for lacking descriptive power, because it cannot fully 
explain the behaviour of local officials. Arable land is converted for urban use regardless of 
strict regulations and potential penalty imposed by the central government (Han & Kung 2015); 
Chinese leaders did not apply the cadre management system to encourage growth (Shih et al. 
2012; Su et al. 2012). These are at odds with the empirical findings in Li and Zhou (2005). 
Most of this strand of literature regards the causality between the ‘tournament competition’ for 
growth and the degree of urbanisation as a pre-condition and proceeds to prove that land 
expansion can contribute to the economic growth (Lin & Ho 2005; Liu et al. 2008; Tao et al. 
2010; Ding & Lichtenberg 2011; He et al. 2014). A technical challenge in the attempt to verify 
this theory is the difficulty of quantifying the likelihood of promotion in the current political 
system in China. 
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Following the RTC thesis, what incentivises local officials to exert efforts and thus influences 
local officials’ behaviour is not whether they would actually be promoted or not, but the 
probability of promotion. To increase the odds of being promoted, local officials exert efforts 
in different directions, that is, use factional ties, manipulate economic growth rate, and use land 
as a leverage in ramping up GDP growth. Some preliminary investigations have already been 
done. Chen et al. (2017b) and Cai et al. (2017), find that the local leaders’ age and the time 
horizon, which are two important impact factors for promotion probability, influence the local 
governments’ land leasing strategy.  
The FF framework considers the complex and unique fiscal and political systems in China and 
subsequently has a better descriptive power. However, existing studies are limited by technical 
problems, such as the endogeneity issues associated with using FDI per capita as the proxy of 
horizontal competition between jurisdictions (Cao et al. 2008; Tao et al. 2010; He et al. 2016; 
Qin et al. 2016). Most importantly, this model does not consider the full range of political 
incentives and constraints of decision-makers. Although local governments are believed to 
mostly follow a monotonous target—maximising revenue—in reality, they do not always do 
so. Therefore, the theory cannot fully explain local governments’ land leasing behaviour, 
especially when there are external shocks like policies from the central government. Recent 
empirical works show that the land leasing strategy is indeed influenced by politicians’ tenure 
limits and mandatory retirement ages (Cai et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2017b). Wang and Hui (2017) 
find that in cities with higher house prices, two-stage auctions are adopted more frequently 
than English auctions. Such interventionist behaviour results in significantly depressed land 
prices and house prices. Political connections also violate the FF thesis—local governments 
usually sell land to politically connected firms at a discount (Cai et al. 2013; Wu & Yang 2020). 
As preliminary as these findings may seem, they certainly indicate an under-researched yet 
important direction for future study. I therefore proposed my own theoretical framework based 
on the FF thesis in section 4.3.  
3.3 Conclusions and Conceptual Framework   
This chapter has introduced the two main theories explaining China’s urbanisation and local 
governments’ incentives. An overarching conceptual framework building on the FF thesis is 
presented in Figure 2.9. It shows that China’s current approach to financing urbanisation has 
been reasonably successful in mobilising the resources that cities needed to grow their 
economies, build essential infrastructure, and deliver services to the expanding urban 
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population. It also demonstrates that unlike western countries, where urbanisation is usually 
fuelled by more spontaneous economic growth or agglomeration, China’s urbanisation is 
driven by local governments’ fiscal imperatives and by political competition between 
jurisdictions. In this process, local governments use land and the laws around it to facilitate the 
rapid expansion of the urban area and to finance the construction of the large-scale urban 
infrastructure needed to attract business and industry. These actions echo existing work that 
(Tao et al. 2010; Su et al. 2012) discusses the horizontal regional competition thesis.  
China’s dual system of treating urban and rural land differently enables local governments to 
sell land at a high price while virtually expropriating it from peasants cheaply. Local 
governments’ monopoly power over land leads to their injecting land-based assets into LGFVs 
to strength their balance sheet and borrow from the financial market. As a result, leasing income 
and LGFV capital represent two major funding sources for infrastructure financing. Intensive 
infrastructure investment drives more urbanisation in surrounding areas, which contributes to 
local economic growth in a feedback loop. Local officials hope to benefit from this: more 
urbanisation leads to higher fiscal revenues and greater probability of their promotion.  
The findings of the thesis not only address the practical problems associated with China’s 
urbanisation, but help specify the FF thesis in three senses. Under the FF thesis, Chinese local 
governments are revenue maximisers (Jin et al. 2005). The FF thesis-based literature mainly 
focusses on how fiscal decentralisation leads to China’s urbanisation, without seeking to 
explain the specific means by which local governments can raise finances and their possible 
externalities or negative consequences (Jin et al. 2005; Jia et al. 2014; Han & Kung 2015; Wu 
et al. 2015b). This work aims to enhance the explanatory power of the FF framework in 




Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework of China’s Urbanisation under the FF Thesis 
 
Note: this figure displays the overarching conceptual framework of the thesis.  
  
 41 
First, Chapter 4 enhances the explanatory power of FF theory in a new era of urban 
development. The thesis successfully accounts for how local governments are selling off 
industrial land cheaply to attract manufacturing industries as a substantial part of future local 
tax bases (Tao et al. 2010; Su et al. 2012; Su & Tao 2017). On the other hand, as anticipated, 
massive investment in infrastructure, particularly airports, rail, and roads, have paved the way 
for the country’s transition to an export-driven economy. In line with the prediction, thousands 
of industrial parks and development zones were set up in the 2000s, with their scale eventually 
amounting to a national phenomenon (Zhang 2011; Herlevi 2017; Su & Tao 2017). The FF 
thesis closely accounts for local governments’ development strategy since China’s accession to 
the WTO in 2001, when fixed investment and exports became the main factors for growth (Zhu 
& Kotz 2011). In May 2020, the Chinese government announced its new development strategy 
in their latest five-year plan: the dual circulation strategy. This aims to strike a new balance 
between global integration (i.e. the ‘first circulation’) and domestic income (i.e. the ‘second 
circulation’) (Blanchette & Polk 2020). Under this new plan, aside from land leasing revenue, 
the debt raised by LGFVs remains a major source for infrastructure financing. The empirical 
results from Chapter 4 show a positive relationship between debt-financed infrastructure and 
commercial land development. The findings of this chapter offer evidence that might help 
refine the FF thesis for this new era: debt-financed infrastructure was built not to accommodate 
export-led manufacturing, but to support a domestic consumption-led economy.  
Second, Chapter 5 elaborates the FF theory by providing the evidence that Chinese style fiscal 
federalism meets the ‘hard budget constraint’ (HBC) condition (Montinola et al. 1995a). Under 
the soft budge constraint (SBC), undisciplined local governments will easily over-borrow from 
the financial market at a low cost, because both the lenders and local governments are expecting 
the potential bailout from the central government (Montinola et al. 1995a; Kornai et al. 2003; 
Ong 2012). The SBC is also detrimental to local governments’ incentives to promote growth 
because the potential bailout removes any fear of the consequence of their choice. Though the 
early studies like Ong (2012) find that Chinese local governments suffered from the SBC, 
Chapter 5 finds that their borrowing costs are heterogeneous. The results from Chapter 5 shows 
that different local governments are borrowing at different costs based on their fiscal soundness, 
and having a higher land leasing revenue can lower LGFVs’ borrowing costs. The findings 
reveal that Chinese local governments are faced with hard budget constraints in the sense that 
the local land leasing revenue and economic prosperity ties directly to the borrowing costs of 
their LGFVs. As local governments’ fiscal problems remain their own, the hard budget 
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constraint provides important incentives for local officials to oversee and ensure their 




Chapter 4  
Financing Infrastructure Projects through Local 
Government Debt in China 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Since the beginning of its economic reform in the 1980s, China has been investing heavily in 
infrastructure projects inside and outside the country. According to the World Bank, China’s 
share of gross fixed capital formation in the GDP increased from 24% in 1990 to 43% in 2018, 
while its GDP growth rates at an impressive rate over the same period (see Figure 4.1). 
Although a high level of investment in infrastructure is expected among emerging economics, 
China’s commitment to infrastructure pales in comparison to that of India, Russia, and Brazil 
(i.e. the rest of the BRIC block), of which the share of gross fixed capital formation in the GDP 
ranged between 20% to 29% in 2018.    
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Figure 4.1 Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP) and National GDP in Trillions 
(current US$) for Industrialised and Emerging Economies, 1990-2019 
 
Source: The World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS and 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.GDI.FTOT.CD).   
Infrastructure investment is an important tool for the Chinese government to stimulate 
economic growth (Wu 2010), to counter regional and global economic crises (World Bank 
2010), and to promote geopolitical agenda (Mohan & Tan-Mullins 2019). Consequently, 
infrastructure development has always been a part of the central government’s master plans. 
For example, infrastructure investment in roads and bridges is central to the Belt and Road 
initiative. Although China has made a significant transition from a central planning system to 
a market-oriented economy in the last three decades, infrastructure development is still firmly 
controlled by the central government’s ‘iron hand’.  
In the last two decades, many developing countries have embarked on fiscal decentralisation, 
transferring the responsibility of public goods provision from central government to local 
governments (Bardhan & Mookherjee 2006). Much of the responsibilities of infrastructure 
development has been gradually shifted to the visible hand of local governments. In the context 
of infrastructure financing, how the local government strategy evolves along with the market-
oriented and decentralisation transition in many countries, has always been of the great interest 
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to the academia and policymakers (Tsui 2011; Wang et al. 2011). This issue is especially 
prominent in China where the central and local governments work closely in the process of 
infrastructure-led urbanisation (He et al. 2016). The rapid urbanisation and economic 
development in China have put great pressure on local governments to finance infrastructure 
development.  
Furthermore, the 1994 tax sharing reform transfers the bulk of tax revenues to the centre, 
leaving local governments with heavy fiscal shortfalls. In less than 20 years, local governments’ 
share of national government revenues has dropped below 40%, while their share of national 
government expenditure stands above 60% (Fan & Lv 2012; Shen et al. 2014). This fiscal 
institutional change, together with the GDP-orientated cadre evaluation system gives local 
governments strong incentives to look for extra-budgetary and off-budgetary revenue (Ong 
2012).  
Land leasing revenue, accounting for the lion’s share of extra budgetary revenue, has become 
an important source of funding for urban infrastructure (Wu 2010; Wang et al. 2011; Ding et 
al. 2014; Feng et al. 2015). In 2018, the total land leasing revenue in China reached 39.9% of 
local government revenue. Moreover, local governments have been found to hoard land to 
control land supply and to raise land price (Du & Peiser 2014). Such a strategy helps local 
governments collect more revenue from land leasing to fund infrastructure projects (He et al. 
2014). This practice results in an upward spiral among land prices, land revenue, and 
infrastructure investment. This phenomenon is referred as 'land finance' in the literature and 
public media (see, for instance, Fu 2015; Wu et al. 2015b; Pan et al. 2017).  
After the financial crisis of 2008, local government debt has become another important source 
of fiscal revenue in China. To help the economy recover from the crisis, China introduced an 
economic stimulus plan in 2009 for large scale infrastructure investment (Shi & Huang 2014). 
In addition, the central government liberalised the financial market for local governments (Bai 
et al. 2016). Both the countercyclical policy and financial liberalisation opened up effective 
channels for local governments to secure credit from the financial market for infrastructure 
investment and development. Even though the 1994 Budget Law prohibited local governments 
from issuing debt and running a deficit, local governments worked round this law by setting 
up off-balance sheet financing vehicles known as LGFVs, which are state-owned enterprises 
that are initially set up by local governments for infrastructure financing and construction, to 
borrow from banks and bond market (Chen et al. 2017a). As a result, China has become the 
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biggest spender on fixed investment (in absolute value) in the world and the most indebted 
country among emerging markets (Dobbs et al. 2015). Such a debt-driven infrastructure 
financing fever is referred to by some scholars as ‘developing by borrowing’ (Pan et al. 2017). 
Despite the importance of the topic, there has been limited research in the literature to aid the 
understanding how infrastructure financing works in China. There is some evidence of local 
governments using land as collateral for municipal debt (see, for example, Wu et al. 2016; 
Jiang & Waley 2018b; Li & Chiu 2018). I find only one empirical study showing that land 
leasing revenue positively affected local government debt volume between 2009 and 2012 (Pan 
et al. 2017). A considerable research gap still exists regarding local governments’ debt 
financing strategy for infrastructure projects. To bridge this gap in the literature, I develop a 
theoretical model to investigate how land financing and business activities from the private 
sector influence local government debt issuing. My theoretical model predicts that, if local 
governments considered business activities from the private sector in debt issuing decisions, 
local government debt level should be determined by the land demand for private development. 
Further a higher level of land finance revenues encourages local governments to borrowing 
more from the credit market. In the empirical investigation, I focus on the debt raised by 
LGFVs, as LGFV debts have become the largest component of local government debt in China.  
This research contributes to the literature by responding to the call for studies on infrastructure 
financing in the Global South (O'Brien et al. 2019; Whiteside 2019). This is one of the few 
investigations into alternative funding and financing models of infrastructure projects in China 
(Tan & Zhao 2019). On the policy front, the findings provide timely assessment of how well 
the ‘iron hand’ of the central government and the ‘visible hand’ of local governments are 
working together on infrastructure provisions. In May 2020, the Chinese government 
announced its new development strategy in the latest five-year plan: the Dual Circulation 
strategy. It is a new balance away from global integration (i.e. the first circulation) and a move 
towards increased domestic reliance (i.e. the second circulation) (Blanchette & Polk 2020). 
Such a strategy helps local governments collect more revenue from land leasing to fund 
infrastructure projects (He et al. 2014). Correspondingly, infrastructure development decisions 
should be more responsive to demand from domestic markets (Buckley 2020). The findings 
suggest that the reforms of local government debt markets in the last decade has paved the road 
for this transition.  
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents a review of local 
government debt and LGFVs in China, followed by the development of a theoretical 
framework and testable hypotheses in Section 4.3. Empirical evidence is presented and 
discussed in Section 4.4 and 4.5. The last section discusses the policy implications and 
conclusions.   
4.2 Literature Review  
4.2.1 Institutional Background  
Chinese political institutions can be described as a ‘regionally decentralised authoritarian 
regime’ (Xu 2011), which is a highly hierarchical system that allows the central government 
to set the criteria for promotion (and demotion) for subordinate governments (province, 
municipal, and county levels). Since the opening up of the economy in the 1980s, greater 
weight has been put on local economy growth, which is measured by local GDP growth rate. 
This results in a GDP-orientated cadre evaluation system. Not surprisingly, local governors are 
highly motivated to boost the GDP growth in their jurisdiction to compete with their peers (Xu 
2011). 
Meanwhile, subordinate governments are also granted a high degree of autonomy over local 
economic activities, as well as the discretion over the use and distribution of local endowments 
such as land and financial resources. Land and infrastructure are crucial to the growth in 
productivity and economic development as the former provides the space and the latter 
facilitates the public services. These haves become two critical factors in many important 
decisions by local governments under China’s GDP-orientated cadre evaluation system. For 
instance, Pan et al. (2017) find that land development is highly correlated with urban growth 
as a large scale of land has been used for the construction of public infrastructure. Ding et al. 
(2014) note that local governments indicate a tendency to channel a large proportion of land 
revenue towards growth orientated infrastructure such as urban roads and highways rather than 
welfare spending. In addition, land revenue has been invested in specific infrastructure that is 
more likely to attract FDI, which stimulates economic growth indirectly in urban areas (Tao et 
al. 2010; He et al. 2014). Such land use strategies in China indeed improve local governors’ 
chances for promotion. Chen and Kung (2016) find that, other things being equal, land leasing 
is positively related to the likelihood of promotion of city governors. Ultimately, local 
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governors turn to land leasing to finance urban development and to advance their political 
career. 
4.2.2 LGFVs in the Land and Financial Markets 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, the central government orchestrated a stimulus 
plan and credit relaxation, and the Ministry of Finance and China Bank Regulation Committee 
(CBRC) opened a new channel to provide credit support and encouraged the establishment of 
LGFVs to invest in infrastructure (Chen et al. 2017a). Since then, LGFVs became an active 
and important player in the land market and a major borrower in the financial market. After the 
crisis, the central government has gradually opened the market for private projects to LGFVs 
(Bai et al. 2016). To raise funds from banks and bond markets, local governments injected 
public assets, such as land and budgetary funds, into LGFVs to improve their balance sheets. 
By doing so, LGFVs could meet the requirements for bond issuance, such as the minimum 
total net asset volume and the debt-to-equity ratio set by the regulatory department. 
As the monopoly supplier in the urban land market in China, local governments can choose 
between two options of injecting land to LGFVs: state allocation (huabo) and conveyance 
(churang). Land parcels transferred to LGFVs through state allocation are free but for public 
use only, such as infrastructure construction or military uses. In addition, the law prohibits 
state-allocated land from being transferred, leased, or used for mortgage lending.  
Land injected through land conveyance is not free but can be used in for-profit projects. LGFVs 
must pay the fee to secure land use rights from local governments. Land conveyance of land 
use rights are conducted through tender, auction or listing, with listings accounting for over 
70% of all transactions (Huang & Du 2017). In addition to infrastructure projects, LGFVs can 
use the land purchased from local governments for commercial projects, such as residential or 
commercial real estate development (Bai et al. 2016).  
LGFVs also borrowed heavily from the financial market to finance their public and private 
projects. Before 2009, more than 90% of LGFVs’ debt was in the form of bank loans (Bai et 
al. 2016), which were worth 5.57 trillion RMB (Pan et al. 2017). Although the average maturity 
of these loans were three to five years, LGFV projects usually last for decades. To deal with 
the maturity mismatch, LGFVs’ borrowing channel has shifted from bank loans to the bond 
market since 2013 (Chen et al. 2017a). Local government debt in China reached 17.89 trillion 
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RMB in 2013, which accounted for 31.5% of that year’s GDP (Wu et al. 2018). The 
geographical variation and level of local governments’ dependence on LGFVs in infrastructure 
development are illustrated in Figure 4.2.  
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Figure 4.2 Proportion of LGFV debt in financing of total infrastructure development in 
China (2009-2017) 
 
4.2.3 Regulations of LGFV debt 
LGFV debt, which are essentially local government debt, can expose the central and local 
governments to substantial systematic risks. First, LGFVs are established to be off-budget 
entities of local governments and are run as a corporate entity. The lack of transparency and 
accountability in LGFVs could be detrimental to the financial system. Second, although local 
governments are monitored and controlled to ensure they operate under a (fiscal) budgetary 
deficit, LGFVs as separate entities are not limited to a deficit budget. In addition, local 
governments have reserved a proportion of fiscal revenues for LGFVs’ solvency of their debts. 
Therefore, the rapid accumulation of local government debt has become a prominent concern 
for the central government. 
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In response to the growing risks associated with the inflated local government debt volume, 
the central government released a series of regulations. In 2010 and 2013, two nation-wide 
audits were carried out by the National Audit Office to identify and classify the outstanding 
amount of local government debt. In a document issued in 2013, the organisational department 
of the China Communist Party included ‘the outstanding of local government debt’ as a critical 
criterion for local cadres’ promotion. In 2014, the State Council issued the ‘No.43 Document’ 
that imposed strict restrictions on LGFVs regarding initiating new debt. Meanwhile, the 
organisational department included municipal debt outstanding amount as a criterion in the 
cadre evaluation system. These regulations from the central government have resulted in some 
fundamental changes in LGFVs’ debt financing strategy, which in turn changed local 
governments’ willingness  to invest infrastructure and the financial environment. In 2015, the 
Amended Budget Law took effect and allowed local governments to raise new debt. Afterwards, 
the Ministry of Finance initiated a large-scale debt swap program, under which a considerable 
amount of LGFV debt could be swapped by general obligation municipal bonds issued by the 
central government. This reduced the financial risk associated with local government debt. 
Table 4.1 Measures and policies aimed at curbing surging debt volumes 
Date Regulations Content 
Dec 2010 Nation-wide debt auditing 
Identify and classify the volume of outstanding 
local government debt 
Jun 2013 Nation-wide debt auditing 
Identify and classify the volume of outstanding 
local government debt 
Dec 2013 
Notice on the improvement of the 
evaluation of leading cadres and leadership 
ranks of local party and government 
administration 
Incorporate the debt outstanding into the cadre 
evaluation system 
Oct 2014 Document 43 issued 
Formally restrict LGFVs from borrowing to fund 
new investment 
Jan 2015 Amended Budget Law took effect 
Granted local governments the right to raise debt 
on their own behalf 
Dec 2015 Debt swap program11 
Swapped 1 trillion or 54% of fully guaranteed 
debt 
 





In line with the FF thesis, this study develops a two-period model to describe local 
governments' behaviour of infrastructure financing 12 . In this two-period cycle, local 
governments aim to develop infrastructure with a target (denoted by Q ), while choosing 
optimal land allocation to maximise land revenue. In the infrastructure study, Q is usually 
measured by the area of land for infrastructure development, with the unit cost k. 
In the first period, the local government aims for infrastructure development target Q1, and 
thus the infrastructure investment can be calculated as kQ1. The local government balances the 
fiscal expenditure including the support to industrial development I1 with unit subsidies s, by 
using land finance (LF1) and debt finance (D1), as described in the equation below.  
LF1 + D1 = kQ1 + sI1 , 
where the land revenue mainly comes from the leasing of commercial and residential lands, 
that is, LF1 = n1C1 + p1R1 where n1 and p1 are the prices of commercial and residential lands 
respectively. Industrial land leasing is not included in this calculation because it doesn’t 
generate positive revenue (e.g. the land price is equal to or less than the cost of land clearance). 
This is because local governments in China have been keeping industrial land prices low, 
sometimes selling them for free or at a net loss, to boost local economic growth (Cao et al. 
2008). 
In the second period, the local government aims for infrastructure development Q2 so that 
Q1 + Q2 = Q. The local government intends to maximise the fiscal balance, which comprises 
the land revenue LF2 = n2C2 + p2R2, infrastructure investment kQ2, and support to industrial 
development with subsidies sI2. The final fiscal balance is  
V2 = LF2 − kQ2 − sI2 .  
Following Cai and Treisman (2005), the total productivity of a city is determined by the public 
and private investments. Specifically, assuming a Cobb-Douglas productivity function as 
follows.  
 
12 It should be noted that if increased debt raises financing costs to above equilibrium, due to the tournament 
political competition, the local officials may want to still invest in development projects. The political structure 




σIαCβ ,   
where A > 0 denotes multi-factor productivity capturing the effect of the local endowment on 
the output, Q , I  and C  represent the stock of infrastructure, industrial, and commercial 
development respectively. Α, β, σ > 0, and α + β + σ < 1 indicates decreasing returns to scale. 














Where Q, I and C represent the stock of infrastructure, industrial, and commercial development 
at time t-1, respectively. Q1, I1 and C1are the flow of infrastructure, industrial and commercial 
development at time t, respectively. In the short run, land prices grow as wages and productivity 
improve (Roback 1982). In this case, land prices change at the rate of yt in each period. For 
example, the prices of commercial land from period 1 to period 1 becomes  



















Meanwhile, land is non-renewable and a limited resource. The local government faces land 
budget constraints for commercial development, that is, C1 + C2 = N.  
Thus, the local government in the second period has the fiscal balance  
V2 = n2C2 + p2R2 − kQ2 − sI2  
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p1R2 + n1 = 0. 
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The maximum debt that the local city government can raise in a given period (e.g. a quarter) is 
regulated by provincial government with a quota system (Huang and Chan, 2018). In this two-
period model, the debt quota is assumed to be D, that is, D1 + D2 ≤ D. Meanwhile, the rate of 
national treasury bond has been declining and money supply (M2) has been increasing in China. 
As a result, local government debt becomes a popular option to raise funds. Most local 



















) dC1.  
This gives the following propositions that captures the role of land finance and the private 









> 0. This suggests that commercial development in the current period has 
a positive effect on local government debt issued in the next period. Specifically, the 
commercial sector affects the local government debt through two channels, that is, immediate 
























< 0. This condition reflects the industrial sector and 




) and negative contribution to land revenue (through −
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s)13. The condition is 










. First, Q < I  as Chinese cities have promoted industrial 






 represents the ratio of the productivity to 
the cost when investing in industry and infrastructure, respectively. The infrastructure 
development shows a substitute effect as it brings enhances efficiency and boosts local 
economy compared to industrial development in China (Shi & Huang 2014). The condition 
 









< 0 thus is almost true, and the inequality indicates the industrial development in the 




= 1. The positive value indicates that land finance in the current period positively 
affects local government debt issued in the next period. On one hand, the local government has 
discretion on the land supply. A higher land revenue indicates a larger demand for fund for 
infrastructure development (Ding et al. 2014; Pan et al. 2017). As land leasing offers an 
effective channel to obtain quick cash to bridge funding gaps, land revenue is more flexible 
than tax revenue in the short run. For the debt loaner, land revenue signifies an additional fund 
to debt solvency. On the other hand, a higher land revenue shows higher land demand and 
larger investments from the private sector. It signals that the private sector holds optimistic 
anticipation regarding economic growth. The development of this sector would improve tax 
revenue in the long run. The strong market expectation also enhances the debt loaner’s 
confidence in the local government’s repayment ability.  
Because the residential sector is not included in the production equation Yt = AQ
σIαCβ , 
equation (2a) shows no direct implications on the role of residential sector. However, the boom 
in China’s residential real estate market causes resources misallocation between real estate and 
other sectors in the economy. Specifically, the residential real estate sector in China has a strong 
crowding-out effect on non-real estate investment (Chen & Wen 2017). Lenders favour 
residential real estate development projects because they offer higher returns than other 
industries (Allen et al. 2019). Due to this crowding-out effect, I expect a negative (albeit 
indirect) relationship between residential land transaction and debt for infrastructure 
investment. Based on the three propositions derived from equation 2(a) of Section 3.3 and the 
analysis on the residential real estate sector, I derive four hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1A: The land acquired by the industrial sector negatively affects the amount of 
local government debt devoted to infrastructure development. 
Hypothesis 1B: The land acquired by the residential sector negatively affects the amount of 
local government debt devoted to infrastructure development. 
Hypothesis 1C: The land acquired by the commercial sector positively affects the amount of 
local government debt devoted to infrastructure development. 
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Hypothesis 2: The land finance positively affects the amount of local government debt devoted 
to infrastructure development.  
Specifically, Hypothesis 1 regards the roles of the private sector while Hypothesis 2 regards 
the role of land finance in the debt dynamics of local governments. The empirical verification 
of my theoretical model and the hypotheses are given in the next section.  
4.4 Empirical Implementation 
I collect data from WIND database and the Land Registry to facilitate the empirical analysis. 
The data set covers 33 major cities14 in China between 2009 and 2017, because LGFV activities 
were limited before 2009. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics of all variables are 
shown in Table 4.2. All data are in quarterly frequency.
 
14 The 33 cities are selected from the list of 35 major cities excluding Lhasa and Ürümqi. The list is defined by 
National Bureau of Statistics in China. 
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Table 4.2 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Data Source Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
InvCF The cash outflow of LGFV investments in a city WIND 61.83 110.94 0.00 1125.36 
OpCF The cash inflows of LGFV operating activities in a city WIND 2.48 12.48 -84.25 91.42 
GCF Gross cash flow of LGFVs in a city, 
GCF = InvCF − OpCF  
WIND 59.36 111.45 -21.46 1176.66 
IndTran Total industrial land sale area WIND 121.30 154.65 0.00 1487.35 
ResTran Total residential land sale area WIND 107.69 131.21 0.00 1644.39 
ComTran Total commercial land sale area WIND 29.83 35.86 0.00 316.55 
IndRev Total industrial land revenue WIND 0.56 0.76 0.00 7.65 
ResRev Total residential land revenue WIND 8.17 11.35 0.00 94.34 
ComRev Total commercial land revenue WIND 2.01 3.68 0.00 38.58 
TotalRev Total land revenue WIND 10.74 13.69 0.00 110.40 
r Capital cost, the national basic lending rate WIND 6.24 0.91 4.76 8.06 
Indpr Log land price of industrial sector in a city WIND 6.52 0.46 5.53 8.31 
Respr Log land price of residential sector in a city WIND 8.48 0.90 6.44 11.11 
Compr Log land price of commercial sector in a city WIND 8.85 0.83 6.82 10.91 
FIP Change in the price index of fixed investment WIND 0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.10 
GDP GDP growth rate in a city WIND 0.03 0.09 -1.01 0.69 
FisRev The local government’s budgetary revenue collected in a city WIND 21.50 26.29 0.28 213.10 
slope The average slope of terrain in a municipality GIM cloud 
(http://www.dsac.cn/DataProduct/Detail/20
0803) 
2.15 1.71 0.06 5.77 
crp The corruption index measured by the total misconduct by 
officials divided by the total officials in each province 
Annual Report on the work of each 
province’s procuratorate 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
lhp Log of the house price in a city  WIND 9.15 0.51 7.89 10.92 
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4.4.1 The Measurement of LGFVs for Infrastructure Development 
To test the hypotheses in Section 4.3, I need a reliable measurement of local government debt 
for infrastructure development. Some exiting studies use LGFV bonds as the proxy, and the 
data between 2009 to 2017 is available (see, for example, Pan et al. 2017). Technically, LGFV 
bonds should be primarily used for infrastructure projects. In practice, it is not the case as a 
part of the fund raised in LGFV bonds are often used for commercial development or for public 
spending (Bai et al. 2016). It is difficult to distinguish the proportion of LGFV bonds for 
infrastructure financing from other uses, because such information is not available to public. 
Consequently, LGFV bonds are not reliable measurements of LGFV debt that were used for 
infrastructure development.  
To address this issue, I use cash flow data of LGFVs to reliably identify the proportion of funds 
used for infrastructure development, because cash flow data provides micro-level accounting 
information that is subject to annual auditing. The data on LGFVs’ cash flow is collected from 
the WIND database. This study’s procedure involves three steps to obtain the estimate of the 
debt that the local government raised for total infrastructure investment.  
The first step is to obtain the cash outflow of investments (InvCF). Under China’s accounting 
standards, it consists of four sub-accounts: 1) cash paid for purchasing and constructing fixed 
assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets, 2) cash paid for investment, 3) net cash 
paid for acquiring subsidiaries and other business units, and 4) cash paid for activities related 
to investment. The first sub-account records the cash outflow related to LGFVs’ infrastructure 
investment. I include the other three as it is common practice for LGFVs to manipulate 
accounts and require their subsidiaries to construct infrastructure in retrospect.   
The second step is to calculate the cash inflow of operating activities (OpCF) that contains 
several sub-accounts. The largest sub-account is cash inflow from selling goods and providing 
services, which represents LGFVs’ real earning under the cash basis accounting system. By 
using this sub-account, I can estimate the cash inflow related to commercial earning. The 
rationale behind this practice is that, only commercial activities can generate cash inflows, 
while most of infrastructure projects cannot produce cash inflow into LGFVs’ account. The 
constructed infrastructure will be transferred from construction in process into accounts 
receivable and will be kept on the balance sheet generating zero cash inflow until the local 
government pays and takes it over. 
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Finally, I calculate the gross investment cash flow of LGFVs (GCF) as the difference between 
the cash outflow of investments and cash inflow of operating activities, that is, GCF = InvCF −
OpCF. This forms the measurement of the debt that the local government raised for total 
infrastructure investment in a city.  
4.4.2 The Measurement of Land Finance and Investment from the Private Sector 
I obtain data from the Land Registry to measure land finance and investments from the private 
sector. To gauge investment activities of the private sector, I obtain data on land acquisition in 
the industrial, residential, and commercial sectors (denoted as IndTran, ResTran, ComTran, 
respectively, as defined in Table 2).  
The measurement of land finance is challenging. I consider three alternative measurements. 
The first variable is the total revenue of land leasing (TotalRev). It is the overall leasing 
revenue of industrial (IndRev), commercial (ComRev) and residential (ResRev) land and is 
commonly used in the land finance literature (Pan et al. 2017). I also construct two variables 
to quantify land finance (LandFin). The first is the ratio of the total land revenue to the total 
budgetary revenue of the local government (Land2Fis). This ratio measures the fiscal reliance 
of local governments on land revenue (Mo 2018). In addition, land revenue to GDP 
(Land2GDP) is adopted as an alternative measurement to Land2Fis (Mo 2018). Land2Fis and 
Land2GDP are better measurements of local governments’ reliance on land sale revenues 
because they are less influenced by the economic scale of each province.  They also alleviate 
potential multicollinearity issues by simultaneously including both land transaction volume 
and revenue in the model.  
4.4.3 The Model 
With the variables defined above, I estimate the following equation 
GCFi,t = α0 + α1IndTrani,t−1 + α2ResTrani,t−1 + α3ComTrani,t−1 + δLandFini,t−1 +
𝛗𝐗i,t−1 + Tt + St + εi,t  
where i and t denote city and time, respectively. 𝐗I,t is a matrix of variables that controls for 
factors likely to affect the dependent variable. It includes the change in the price index of fixed 
investment (FIPI,t), capital cost (i.e. the lending rate rt), GDP growth rate at the city level 
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( GDPI,t ), the log prices of residential, industrial, and commercial land at the city level 
(Land priceI,t), and fixed effects including year effect (TJ) and seasonal effect (SK). The details 
are provided in Table 2.  
To test Hypotheses 1A through 1C, I expect that α1 < 0, α2 < 0, and α3 < 0. For Hypothesis 
2 to be true, the coefficient estimates of LandFinI,t−1 should be positive.  
4.5 Empirical Findings  
4.5.1 Fixed-effect Panel Regression Estimations 
I first estimate both fixed-effect and random-effect panel regression models with clustered 
standard errors at the city level. The Hausman test suggests that fixed-effect models fit the data 
better. Thus, my discussions are based on the fixed-effect panel regression outputs in Table 4.3.  
First, the coefficients of IndTran and ResTran are negative while that of ComTran is positive. 
This supports Hypothesis 1. The three sectors, however, consider weak impacts on the local 
government debt as none of the coefficients are statistically significant. In other words, the 
local government did not take the future development of the private sector into account when 
using debt financing. Second, the coefficients of the three land finance measurements, that is, 
TotalRev, Land2Fis  and Land2GDP  are positive and statistically significant at 10%. The 
results support Hypothesis 2 that the land finance positively affects the local government debt.   
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Table 4.3. Estimation outputs of panel regression (Dependent variable: GCF) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
IndTrani,t−1 -0.071 -0.071 -0.070 -0.063 -0.072 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) 
ResTrani,t−1 -0.020 -0.001 -0.033 -0.048 -0.019 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.035) (0.025) 
ComTrani,t−1 0.135 0.131 0.129 0.159 0.153 
 (0.132) (0.134) (0.135) (0.138) (0.136) 
Land2Fisi,t−1 6.083*     
 (3.349)     
Land2GDPi,t−1  70.879*    
  (41.597)    
TotalRevi,t−1   1.023***   
   (0.242)   
ResRevi,t−1    1.393***  
    (0.324)  
ComRevi,t−1     -0.353 
     (0.508) 
FIPi,t−1 374.766*** 373.272*** 336.834*** 336.477*** 380.5796*** 
 (85.008) (85.234) (84.739) (82.658) (88.393) 
ri,t−1 -14.354*** -13.890*** -13.487*** -13.119*** -14.645*** 
 (4.448) (4.369) (4.353) (4.295) (4.268) 
GDPi,t−1 0.267 1.601 -1.233 -1.444 0.40763 
 (16.156) (15.880) (15.802) (15.476) (16.271) 
indpri,t−1 35.156 35.415 31.103 33.260 37.332 
 (52.260) (52.177) (50.177) (48.841) (53.360) 
respri,t−1 33.470 33.840 27.040 26.323 32.888 
 (27.813) (27.852) (26.522) (26.125) (28.193) 
compri,t−1 -25.845 -26.165 -17.635 -16.038 -27.979 
 (27.830) (27.374) (27.618) (27.781) (27.273) 
Seasonal FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Wald-test 4.13*** 6.07*** 10.79*** 11.71*** 7.98*** 
Hausman test 30.90** 29.21** 53.64*** 30.16** 6.21 
# of obs. 1146 1155 1155 1155 1155 
Notes: significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The standard errors are clustered at the city level and shown in 
parentheses. 
I further explore the data by including the revenue from residential land leasing (ResRev) and 
commercial land leasing (ComRev) separately in the model. On average, residential land 
revenue accounts for 70% of total land revenue while commercial land revenue takes up 20%. 
The industrial revenue is excluded as previous studies show that Chinese local governments 
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have controlled industrial land prices to sell land to the private sector at low price, and 
sometimes even for free or at a net loss to boost local economic growth (Cao et al. 2008). 
Models 4 and 5 show that ResRev positively and significantly affects the local debt while 
ComRev negatively but insignificantly affects the local debt. The possible reason for the latter 
is that the commercial land revenue is not a major source for local governments to finance 
infrastructure. The findings of land revenue are similar to those of land finance reliance, and 
support Hypothesis 2. A higher level of land finance would lead to a higher level of local 
government debt financing for infrastructure. 
4.5.2 Instrumental Variable Estimations 
As LGFV debt and land finance are under the control of local governments, the estimations 
may be biased by endogenous variables calculated based on land revenue (i.e. TotalRev, 
Land2Fis, and Land2GDP). To address this issue, the instrumental variable (IV) approach is 
employed to re-estimate the models.  
Following the strategy for instrumenting land revenue in the study of local governance and 
politics in Chen and Kung (2016), I select several proxies to instrument the supply and demand. 
First, land suitable for commercial and residential development in a city serves as a suitable 
candidate to instrument the supply. I use the average slope of terrain (slope) as the IV. House 
prices (lhp) are adopted as the IV for land demand. I also include the interaction between house 
price and terrain slope for the IVs. In addition, land transactions are found to be distorted by 
government corruption (Chen & Kung 2016). Hence, the interaction between house prices and 
corruption index (crp) is employed as an additional IV for land revenue. The data for house 
prices and slopes are collected from the WIND database. 
The two-stage (2SLS) estimation within fixed effect panel model is applied for the IV 
regression. To confirm my identification strategy, I regress both the dependent variable and 
endogenous land finance by the instrumental and control variables in the first stage of the model. 
The standard errors are clustered at the city level. I found an insignificant relationship between 
the dependent and IVs while significant relationships between land finance and IVs. This 
suggests that these two IVs are valid. 
In the second stage, GCF is regressed on the predicted values of land revenue from the first 
stage estimation and control variables. I report the results in Panel A in Table 3. The IV 
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estimations show some improvements over the OLS panel regression results in Table 4.4. First, 
the results of IV regression are consistent with the results of panel regression. The point 
estimates (absolute value) of 2SLS are greater than those of OLS, which suggests that OLS 
estimate is likely to be downward biased. I find a negative effect from the industrial and 
residential sectors, and a positive effect from the commercial sector on local government debt 
for infrastructure development across five models. The findings are consistent with Hypothesis 
1. However, only the coefficients of ResTran are significant at the 10% level in model (III) 
and (IV). Overall, the support to Hypothesis is weak. Second, all instrumented land finance 
variables except for ComRev show that the land finance significantly and positively affects the 
local government debt; Hypothesis 2 is true. 
4.5.3 Evidence of Structural Changes 
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, the two documents (‘Document 43’ and ‘Notice on the 
improvement of the evaluation of leading cadres and leadership ranks of local party and 
government administration’) significantly changed local governments’ borrowing behaviours. 
It is possible that there was a structural break around 2013. Thus, the five models in the Panel 
A of Table 4.3 are re-estimated by using the subsamples between 2013-2017. The results are 
reported in Panel B in Table 4.4. 
The subsample results suggest that land finance significantly and positively affects local 
government debt in Models I through III. The results are consistent with those of the full sample. 
The patterns of the private sector are consistent with those of the full sample as well. Industrial 
and residential sectors negatively influence while the commercial sector positively influences 
the local government’s debt financing for infrastructure development across the six models. 
The direction, relative magnitude, and statistical significance of the effects of land finance 
remains the same as in the full-sample models.  
Furthermore, the effects of residential and commercial sectors become significant in Models I 
through IV. This supports Hypothesis 1B and 1C. The difference in significance of coefficients 
of the private sector between the sub-sample and full sample indicates that ‘Document 43’ 
reshaped local governments’ strategy in infrastructure financing. After 2013, local 
governments’ debt financing of infrastructure projects is more responsive to activities of the 
private sector in their cities. Specifically, local governments consider the future development 
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of the commercial and residential sectors because the former enhances debt solvency through 
tax revenue in the long run and the latter crowds out other sectors from capital markets.  
In summary, both the public and the private sectors affect local government debt issuing for 
infrastructure financing. For the public sector, land finance propels the debt level, and the 
pattern is not affected by the local government debt market reform around 2013. The influence 
from activities in the private sector (i.e. the residential and commercial real estate markets), on 
the other hand, is only significant after 2013. Although the theoretical model implies the 
industrial development should restrict the local governments’ debt financing, the data shows 
the industrial sector has small, negative impacts on local government debt.
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Table 4.4 Estimation results of the second stage of 2SLS model within fixed effect panel 
Model  Panel A: Sampling period 2009Q1-2017Q4 Panel B: Sampling period 2013Q3-2017Q4 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
IndTrani,t−1 -0.063 -0.063 -0.065 -0.050 -0.078 -0.134 -0.128 -0.099 -0.084 -0.082 
 (0.060) (0.056) (0.053) (0.052) (0.056) (0.098) (0.097) (0.093) (0.092) (0.103) 
ResTrani,t−1 -0.176 -0.133 -0.115* -0.133* -0.016 -0.292** -0.371** -0.310*** -0.315*** -0.213 
 (0.110) (0.081) (0.066) (0.071) (0.053) (0.138) (0.195) (0.113) (0.117) (0.238) 
ComTrani,t−1 0.039 0.042 0.106 0.178 -0.171 0.391** 0.372** 0.489** 0.591*** -0.397 
 (0.145) (0.146) (0.142) (0.145) (0.267) (0.205) (0.187) (0.204) (0.218) (0.947) 
Land2Fisi,t−1 76.442**     115.818*     
 (40.518)     (61.96)     
Land2GDPi,t−1  576.937**     809.436**    
  (297.012)     (422.886)    
TotalRevi,t−1   2.651**     2.930**   
   (1.122)     (1.169)   
ResRevi,t−1    3.180**     3.212**  
    (1.464)     (1.361)  
ComRevi,t−1     12.514     26.743 
     (12.517)     (31.881) 
FIPi,t−1 326.533*** 347.125*** 273.020*** 284.590*** 247.702** -476.475 -514.661 -19.761 -17.844 -308.299 
 (116.956) (93.222) (89.092) (97.734) (98.743) (377.137) (362.291) (133.118) (130.248) (519.167) 
ri,t−1 -4.549 -8.739 -11.6972** -11.2064** -13.405** 42.344 50.272 13.038 10.991 29.075 
 (8.323) (5.955) (4.700) (4.904) (5.234) (35.511) (34.572) (10.967) (11.132) (26.453) 
GDPi,t−1 -0.202 10.503 -3.75968 -3.749 -1.541 40.369 97.738 4.751 2.619 22.569 
 (17.686) (17.09) (15.212) (15.316) (17.515) (51.999) (79.548) (26.055) (24.745) (43.782) 
indpri,t−1 34.596 37.948 28.088 32.178 15.986 107.642 110.598 96.552 90.849 132.681 
 (52.881) (53.249) (50.113) (48.465) (49.689) (68.261) (74.523) (59.515) (59.308) (104.517) 
respri,t−1 18.822 18.664 21.746 22.022 20.900 46.541 45.096 58.541 60.555 42.954 
 (30.749) (30.673) (27.674) (28.196) (27.494) (49.927) (49.692) (46.568) (45.874) (67.123) 
compri,t−1 -13.479 -13.378 -11.144 -10.411 -14.398 -41.796 -40.043 -45.300 -45.060 -50.505 
 (32.726) (33.143) (29.65) (29.384) (31.367) (46.022) (46.014) (32.509) (31.268) (53.105) 
Seasonal FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Wald-test 684.03*** 1388.54*** 3352.73*** 3506.90*** 3208.29*** 1393.22*** 2950.52*** 726.07*** 746.44*** 987.07*** 
# of obs. 1146 1155 1155 1155 1155 594 594 594 594 594 
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Notes: significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The standard errors are clustered at the city level and shown in parentheses. 
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4.6 Policy Implications and Conclusions 
One of the most important roles of public policy is the provision of public goods and 
infrastructure (Collier & Venables 2017). This is a challenging undertaking for developing 
countries, where local and central governments often face tight financial constraints. In China, 
local governments have been using the land-value capture model to finance infrastructure 
projects. Although this strategy served China’s rapid urbanisation process well in the past, there 
has been widespread concern about the potential systematic risk resulting from the land finance 
model. Local governments are under pressure to find alternative funding sources. 
In the last decade, local government debt, particularly LGFV debt, has become an important 
source to finance infrastructure development in China. Ideally, the use of land leasing revenue 
will reduce the total cost of infrastructure projects as it does not involve interest payment. The 
interest payment of local government debt should be justified by tax revenues generated from 
infrastructure-supported activities from the private sector. A well-balanced ‘capital structure’ 
of infrastructure projects is a good mix to ensure healthy land leasing revenue (i.e. the equity) 
and local government debt (i.e. the debt part), such that local governments are neither over-
reliant on land leasing revenue nor overburdened by debt interest payment. 
Given the outstanding levels of local government debt after the 2008 global financial crisis, it 
is important to investigate whether local government debt issuing is responsive to activities in 
the private sector. The analysis of LGFV data between 2009 and 2017 shows a positive 
relationship between land finance and local government debt for infrastructure development 
throughout the sampling period. This relationship became slightly stronger after stricter 
regulations on local government debt announced between 2013-2014. On the other hand, local 
government debt issuing response to the private sector was weak before the tightening of local 
government debt in 2013/14 and has become stronger and wider since then. During the 2013-
2017 subsampling period, local government debt was positively affected by the commercial 
development, and negatively affected by the residential development. The relationship between 
local government debt level and the industrial sector remains insignificant throughout the 
whole sampling period.  
The empirical results suggest that not only is the visible hand of local governments working 
creatively to meet infrastructure development targets handed down by the ‘iron hand’ of the 
central government, but local governments are also becoming more effective by considering 
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private sector activities in their debt issuing decisions. The regulations of local government 
debt issuance released in 2013-14 are the triggers of such responsiveness to market information. 
Although this transformation has not been completed across all sectors, it does suggest that the 
financing model of infrastructure projects is heading in a promising direction.  
This study is a response to the call for further infrastructure financing research from the Global 
South in general. I provide both a theoretical model and empirical evidence of the complex 
relationship between local government debt issuing for infrastructure financing, land finance, 
and demand from the private sector in China. More importantly, this study also has significant 
policy implications to the Dual Circulation economic development strategy, which is an 
essential part of the latest Five-Year Plan accounted for in May 2020 (The People’s Daily 2020). 
This requires the funding, financing, and management of infrastructure projects to be more 
responsive to the domestic markets than foreign direct investment. The responsiveness of local 
government debt issuing to business activities in the commercial and residential sectors, and 
the irresponsiveness of local government debt issuing to the industrial sector (which is more 
driving by foreign direct investment) indicate that the 2013/14 local government debt reform 
may have paved the way for the implementation of the Dual Circulation strategy. Policy makers 
should be cautious about the strong and consistent positive relationship between land leasing 
revenue and local government debt level, particular after the central government tightened the 
local government debt markets in 2013/14. The regulation of local debt markets will trigger 
the adjustment of other financing means, such as land leasing revenue. The central government 
should be aware of such intriguing interrelationships among alternative financing methods.    
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Chapter 5  
LGFV Bond Yield and Land Market 
 
5.1 Introduction 
From 2008 to 2020, the total outstanding amount of LGFV bonds went up by 10 times, from 
1.89 trillion RMB to 10.87 trillion RMB (USD 1.65 trillion). This amount represented 28.1% 
of the total bonds outstanding of the Chinese bond market (38.69 trillion), representing a sum 
equivalent to 10.6% of total GDP (101.59 trillion) by the end of 2020. What makes LGFV 
bonds unique is their zero-default record (thus far) compared with an average default rate of 
1.24% for the whole non-LGFV bond sector. LGFV bonds play an important role in both 
China’s bond market and financial system, but the LGFV bond market has attracted a 
disproportionately small amount of academic and policy world attention. 
Of this attention, most has taken the form of criticism and concerns expressed about the long-
term viability of China’s system of debt financing. For example, the strong connection between 
LGFV bonds and China’s land development has raised concerns over the risks attached to such 
a huge amount of debt. One concern is that LGFV bonds are generally issued to finance local 
infrastructure construction and preparatory works like land acquisition and to compensate 
previous owners (typically farmers; see Chapter 3 for more details)—activities which generate 
nearly zero cash inflow. The debt parcelled in LGFV bonds is expected to be repaid out of 
future land-related revenue generated from rising land prices and the proceeds of land leasing. 
Many scholars (He et al. 2014; Zhang & Barnett 2014) and organisations like the IMF (2016) 
are concerned that if land values fall, the value of land collateral will depreciate, which may 
pose a threat to lenders.  
The literature has found that China’s LGFVs enjoy lower borrowing costs compared with non-
LGFVs thanks to local governments’ implicit guarantee of them (Ambrose et al. 2015). Due to 
this implicit guarantee, the yield spreads of LGFVs bond are determined by local governments’ 
fiscal conditions and economic development (Ang et al. 2018). As a result, a booming housing 
market as a rule adds extra solvency to local fiscal conditions and tends to depress the yield 
(and raise the price) on LGFV bonds (Ambrose et al. 2015; (Ang et al. 2018). 
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Theoretically, however, it is not clear how local governments’ activities in raising land finance 
should affect bondholders. Both Ambrose et al. (2015) and Ang et al. (2018) support the idea 
that rising local house prices are correlated with lower borrowing costs for LGFVs, yet the 
mechanism of how land markets affect the yield of LGFV bond is still not fully understood. 
Besides, this research was mostly conducted before 2014 when the central government issued 
a series of regulations curbing the growth of local government debt. The impact of these 
regulations on LGFV bond markets remains unclear.  
This chapter frames three hypotheses explaining the mechanism through which the land market 
affects the default risks of LGFV bonds: a land revenue channel, a ‘land dependence’ channel, 
and a ‘land collateral’ channel. By using a new dataset between 2011 and 2019, the study is 
able to verify its hypotheses on the basis of empirical evidence.  
In receiving revenue from land, LGFVs undertake the role of infrastructure provision, which 
should have been played by local governments. In effect, LGFVs act functionally as a 
government department in corporate guide (in a ‘corporate coat’, in Chinese), while de facto 
control of the financial vehicle lies with government. The financing platform otherwise does 
not engage in corporate activities that might generate cash inflows, and its debt repayment 
ability is relatively weak compared with other companies. LGFVs of this structure, or function, 
depend heavily on the fiscal revenue of the local government as a guarantee for debt repayment. 
The expectation in setting up the vehicle is that land leasing revenues will improve local 
government finances, strengthen local governments’ ability to guarantee the solvency of 
LGFVs, and reduce debt repayment risks.  
However, as land leasing revenue fluctuates more, and is more unsustainable in principle than 
budgetary revenue, a higher proportion of total fiscal revenue arising from land leases is likely 
to be correlated with higher volatility in a local government’s disposable income. Therefore, 
LGFVs’ repayment risks are likely to be higher when a region’s reliance on land leasing 
revenue accounts for a higher proportion of its total fiscal revenue.  
From another perspective, the land assets held by LGFVs can be viewed as a form of collateral. 
The literature has found that a booming local land market will lead to higher valuations of a 
local government’s (or LGFVs’) real estate assets currently held apart from the market; these 
assets represent collateral for firms to borrow (Chaney et al. 2012). If the platform encounters 
debt repayment difficulties, LGFVs have the option of selling land assets in hand. Therefore, 
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rising local land prices will raise the liquidation value of land assets, making LGFVs’, in 
principle, less vulnerable to default.  
This chapter provides empirical evidence for these hypotheses. Higher local land leasing 
revenues lower the yield spread on LGFV bonds, while a higher proportion of land leasing 
revenue in the total budgetary income increases LGFVs’ borrowing costs. However, such a 
relationship only started to hold after the landmark policy document No.43 issued in 2014. The 
chapter further contributes to the literature on Chinese LGFV debt by estimating how the 
implicit guarantor’s perceived tax solvency affects the pricing of LGFV bonds (Ambrose et al. 
2015; Liu et al. 2017; Ang et al. 2018). As land revenue constitutes a large proportion of a 
local government’s fiscal revenue, the local land market directly determines the cost of LGFV 
bonds. 
Second, several recent studies attempt to ascertain the impact of changes in the price of real 
estate assets on the costs of debt. This chapter contributes to the literature on how real estate 
may be used as collateral in debt financing. Using a different dataset, Wu et al. (2015a) find 
that real estate collateral effects do not hold in China, but Chen et al. (2015) suggest that the 
effect holds only for private firms. The analysis confirms LGFVs lower borrowing costs by 
using land as collateral. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 describes the arrangements by which 
local government bonds attract investment in China. Section 5.3 reviews the literature and 
proposes the main hypotheses tested in the chapter. Section 5.4 describes the sample selection 
procedure and variables used in the empirical tests. Section 5.5 examines the hypotheses 
empirically and model policy shocks. Section 5.6 states the policy implications of the findings. 
Section 5.7 summarises these findings.   
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5.2 Literature Review  
5.2.1 Land Finance and LGFV Bond 
Empirical evidence shows that the volume of LGFV issuance and land finance share the same 
main driver. Pan et al. (2017) find that the level of local governments’ land leasing premia and 
the magnitude of their debts are positively correlated. They also find that political competition 
and budgetary revenue, the two main drivers of land (Cao et al. 2008; Wu et al. 2015b), have 
a positive correlation with LGFV debt volume. Wu et al. (2016) documents how the city of 
Guangzhou ran into difficulty in selling land parcels to repay the bank loans and LGFV bonds. 
The sharp rise in residential land sales in the context of local governments’ fiscal shortfalls 
supports the hypothesis that local officials use land financing to stimulate economic 
development. Jiang and Waley (2018a) describe the case of a Shanghai Shenhong LGFV. They 
found that urban investment and development companies (UIDCs) enjoy a privileged 
relationship with local governments giving them special access to the land market and to bank 
loans. This research confirms local governments’ debt financing behaviour is closely related 
to land financing. 
5.2.2 The Determinants of LGFV Bond Yield 
Due to their implicit ultimate backing from local governments (see section 2.1 for more details), 
the yields of LGFV bond show distinctive features, with the risk premium reflecting the local 
government’s financial strength rather than company (special vehicle) fundamentals. Luo and 
Chen (2019)’s research shows that most conventional bond characteristics like duration, size 
and guarantee play an important role in determining both the bond yield and credit rating of 
LGFV issues. However, the bond issuer’s characteristics have little explanatory power. 
Scholarship has found that the economic development and fiscal health of the local government 
affects the yield of LGFV bonds in a given region. For example, Chen et al. (2015) find 
regional disparities in economic development between the mid-west and east, as these are 
manifest in the different costs investors pay to trusts backed by the guarantees of regional 
municipal governments. Even when municipal governments in less developed regions 
guarantee LGFV loans, this does not always translate to a lower cost of development capital. 
Investors take credit ratings seriously, meaning that a higher notional credit rating (e.g. for a 
less developed region) does not always lead to a lower interest rate. Liu et al. (2017) also find 
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that provincial fiscal conditions (i.e. the local government’s fiscal balance sheet) has also 
become an important determinant of LGFVs’ yield spread.  
In terms of the impact of real estate on LGFV bonds, the literature finds that the yield on LGFV 
bonds is closely related to the health of the local real estate market and to a perception of local 
political risks. Using the difference between the LGFV bond yield and a synthetic matching 
central government yield, Ang et al. (2018) find that, apart from company-specific 
characteristics, LGFVs located in provinces where real estate values account for a higher 
proportion of local GDP tend to carry lower financing costs. One standard deviation in local 
real estate GDP corresponds to about an 8.6% decrease in excess LGFV bond yields. At the 
same time, political risk, proxied by the total number of local officials arrested for corruption 
in a given region, has a significant negative effect on LGFV bond prices. In other words, 
heavily corrupt regions carry higher political risks reflected in higher financing costs. Ambrose 
et al. (2015) find that areas with higher expected house price growth are able to issue debt at 
lower risk premia, which suggests that the extent or intensity of real estate development is an 
important determinant of LGFV bonds’ yield curve. 
In sum, investors price the strength or plausibility of local governments’ implicit guarantee into 
LGFVs’ bond yields. In particular, the local government’s fiscal strength, the local housing 
market, and the political risks are important determinants of bond yields. However, little 
research has addressed itself to the mechanism of how local land markets affect the yield. 
5.3 Research Hypotheses 
The literature shows that LGFVs are backed by implicit local government guarantees (Ambrose 
et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2017; Ang et al. 2018). Regions adopting different degrees of land 
development face different fiscal conditions (Cao et al. 2020). As land-related revenue 
constitutes a large part of local governments’ total revenue, an increase in local land leasing 
revenue typically translates into an increase in local fiscal disposable income. Investors 
generally believe in the guarantee of LGFV bonds, which means that as the solvency of local 
governments improve, the default risk of LGFV bonds tends to fall and its yield spread begins 
to tighten.  




On the one hand, the real estate market itself is highly volatile (Grenadier 1995; Liu et al. 
2016a), and residential land revenues lead to a high degree of fluctuation. The Chinese real 
estate market is under huge pressure from central government macro-policy partly in response 
to how its revenues are more volatile than general budgetary revenue (Wang & Hui 2017; Li 
et al. 2020). In normal times, real estate values increase and LGFVs are able to rollover debts 
without increasing their cost of financing. In difficult times, when land values are falling, debt 
holders may demand more collateral, which increases financing costs and generates a 
significant rollover risk for LGFVs. 
Hypothesis 2: LGFV located in the regions with heavier land revenue dependence should have 
higher borrowing costs. 
The relationship between the land market and LGFV borrowing costs can be understood at a 
micro firm level. Research has found a ‘real estate collateral channel’ for companies otherwise 
facing financial constraints. Chaney et al. (2012) reveal that firms would invest more if the 
value of real estate in hand increases. In the context of China, Wu et al. (2015a) find that the 
real estate collateral channel does not hold. Using firms' real estate holdings of Chinese listed 
firms, the rising land price cannot help firms borrow more. In contrast to Wu et al. (2015a)’s 
finding, Chen et al. (2015) detect a collateral channel for private Chinese firms. Because local 
governments inject land assets into LGFVs to strength their balance sheet, a booming local 
land market means a higher value for the LGFVs’ collateral, making them more capable of 
repaying borrowings.   
Hypothesis 3: LGFVs holding land assets in the regions experiencing a real estate boom would 
enjoy lower borrowing cost due to the collateral channel. 
5.4 Data and Variables 
5.4.1 Sample Selection 
Information on LGFV bond characteristics, offering yields and ratings, financial conditions of 
the issuing LGFVs, as well as fiscal conditions of the local governments (cities) are taken from 
the WIND database for the period between 2011 and 2019. Since financial and fiscal variables 
are available annually and often not publicly disclosed until at least a quarter after each year-
end, I match LGFV bond yield spreads with lagged financial and fiscal variables. The study 
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eliminates observations of unavailable LGFV financial data and cities without fiscal variables. 
The final sample consists of 9,336 nonconvertible bond issues made by 1,458 unique LGFVs. 
Figure 5.1 shows the regional distribution of the final sample.  
5.4.2 Measurement of Cost of Bond Financing  
I employ the Yield Spread, measured by the at-issue bond yield in excess of the Treasury yield 
with comparable maturity, to gauge the cost of bond financing. This measure is widely used in 
the literature to capture the ex-ante cost of debt (Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003; Mansi et al. 2004; 
Ortiz-Molina 2006). 
Unlike international credit rating systems, which have wide rating ranges, the Chinese credit 
rating system has only four rating categories, from AAA to AA-. The literature has found that 
while Chinese bond rating agencies’ (CRAs) ratings are not comparable with those of 
international CRAs, they reflect the different default risks (Livingston et al. 2018). For credit 
ratings, I follow Livingston et al. (2018) to compute the bond rating using a conversion process 
in which AAA rated to AA- rated bonds are assigned a value of 4 to 1. For yield spread, I use 
the 10-year treasury bond as the bench market. 
5.4.3 Measurement of Firm’s Land Asset Holding  
To test the land asset collateral channel, I first develop an estimate of annual change in the 
value of firms’ real estate asset holdings at the time of LGFVs’ bond issuance. Following Wu 
et al. (2015a)’s methods, I use changes in the market value over time of real estate assets owned 
by the LGFV in the reference year alongside a standardised measure of LGFVs’ total assets. 





where RatioREV1I,t is the market value of real estate assets owned by firm I at the end of year 
t (i.e. at the end of the previous year), LPYOYc,t is the annual growth rate in the local land price 
growth for firm i’s headquarters city c in year j, and ASSETI,t−1 is the total assets of firm i at 
the beginning of year t (i.e. at the end of the previous year). 
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To check the robustness of the measurement, I also use the HPYOYc,t， the annual growth rate 
in the local house price growth for firm i’ s headquarters city c  in year t as alternative 
measurements.  
RatioREV2i,t =
[LandAssets i,t−1 × HPYOYc,t]
ASSETi,t−1
 
5.4.4 Other Variables 
Given the developing nature of the Chinese bond market, I follow the seminal work of 
Livingston et al. (2018) regarding the control variables: bond maturity and issue amount. I 
include an inter-bank dummy to show which exchange the bond is traded on, because it has 
been found that bonds are traded at higher prices on the exchange market than those traded by 
institutional investors in the interbank market in China (Liu et al. 2019). I control for the 
issuer’s accounting data, which are commonly included in bond yield research (Huang et al. 
2015; Luo & Chen 2019): the logarithm of total assets, ROA, and net leverage ratio. Factors 
that influence the fiscal condition of local governments are also included: fiscal pressure 
measured by the budgetary expenditure divided by the fiscal revenue. As a higher level of local 
governments translates to a stronger fiscal condition, I also control for the level of local 
government associated with a specific LGFV.  
5.4.5 Summery Statistics  
Figure 5.1 shows the regional distribution of aggregate LGFV bond issuance amount. I find 
that the regional heterogeneity in bond issuance is significant. The east coast regions like 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian rank in the first tier of debt issuance amount regions, whereas the 
debt scale of west regions like Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Ningxia are small. Among north-east 




Figure 5.1 Regional distribution of aggregate LGFV bond volume during the sampling period 
(2011-2019) 
 
Notes: Tibet did not issue any LGFV bond during the sample period. Numbers are in billion Yuan.  
Table 5.1 summarises the definitions and descriptive statistics of variables employed in this 
study, including firms’ financial information, bond information, and local economic 
information. Local land market information includes land leasing revenue, ratio of land leasing 
revenue to the total budgetary revenue, annual land price growth rate, and annual house price 
growth rate. Financial information includes firm size, leverage ratio, and return on assets 
(ROA). Local economic condition includes growth of the local economy, land price, and level 
of the local government’s fiscal pressure.  
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Table 5.1 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
A. Dependent Variables     
YIELD_SPREAD 
Yield of LGFV bond issues minus same 
maturity of 10-Year Treasury bond 
2.407 1.151 -2.178 8.261 
RATINGS  
Ordinal variable taking on values from 4 to 
1 representing AAA to AA respectively 
3.046 0.857 1.000 4.000 
B. Local Land Market Attributes     
LAND_REV 
One year lag of logged total land leasing 
revenue in a given city  
5584422 5487718 111405 26400000 
LAND_DEP 
One year lag of total land leasing revenue 
to budgetary revenue in a given city  
0.411 0.289 0.024 1.708 
LP_YOY Annual land price growth in a given city  0.340 0.612 -0.745 5.548 
HP_YOY Annual house price growth in a given city  0.061 0.106 -0.420 0.470 
C. Bond Information      
RATING_RES 
Rating residual after orthogonalized with 
bond, firm, and local characteristics  
-1.14e-10 0.553 -3.90 2.796 
INT_DUM 
= 1 if the bond is traded in the inter-bank 
market 
0.761 0.426 0 1 
PUBLIC_DUM = 1 if bond is public offering 0.719 0.450 0 1 
AMOUNT 
Log of gross amount of bonds issued in 
billions of RMB  
10.608 7.706 0.250 100 
MATURITY Log of years to bond maturity 4.197 2.659 0.038 23.000 
D. Firm’s Financial Information      
ROA 
One year lag of income before 
extraordinary item over total assets 
1.548 1.790 -14.927 26.017 
ASSET 
One year lag of logged of the total book 
value of assets 
627.706 1084.444 1.597 23134.530 
LEVERAGE 
One year lag of total book debt over total 
assets 
86.836 66.954 -164.224 513.500 
RATIO_REV1 
Change in the market value of real estate 
assets measured by local land price 
changes, held at the beginning of each year, 
normalised by firm assets (see the text for 
more details) 
0.004 0.021 -0.044 0.551 
RATIO_REV2 
Change in the market value of real estate 
assets, measured by local house price 
changes, held at the beginning of each year, 
normalised by firm assets (see the text for 
more details) 
0.001 0.004 -0.008 0.094 
E. Local Economic Information      
GDPG 
One year lag of the growth rate of GDP in 
a given city  
0.100 0.045 -1.000 0.383 
LAND_PRICE 
One year lag of the land price in a given 
city 
7.823 0.875 5.626 10.267 
FISCAL_PRESS 
One year lag of budgetary expenditure to 
budgetary revenue in a given city  
1.343 0.339 0.904 3.826 
Note: This table summarises the primary variables used in this study. The first column shows the variable name. The second 
column briefly presents the definition of each variable. Column 3 to 7 present the number of observations, mean, standard 
deviation, minimum value, and maximum value, respectively. The table mainly consists of five panels: dependent variables. 
Local land market attributes, bond information, firm’s financial information, and local economic information  
 
5.5 Empirical Findings 
To test the hypothesis proposed in Section 4, I research the land revenue and land collateral 
effect on LGFV bond rating and yield spreads through the following regressions: 
Ratingsi,j,t = α0 + α1Landrevj,t−1 + α2Landdepj,t−1
+ α3RATIOREVj,t−1 + α4Lj,t−1 +




= α0 + α1Landrevj,t−1 + α2Landdepj,t−1
+ α3RATIOREVj,t−1 +
α4Ratingresi,t + α5Lj,t−1 + φBi + Tt + δZi,t−1 + Ct + εi,t (2) 
To address possible endogeneity concerns, all variable of interests and the control variables are 
in one year lag. In equation (1), where RatingsI,j,t  is the rating of LGFV bond i  in local 
government j in year t; Landrevj,t−1 and Landdepj,t−1
are the total land leasing revenue and the 
ratio of land leasing revenue to budgetary revenue in local government j; RATIOREV  is the 
change in the market value of real estate assets measured by local land price changes, held at 
the beginning of each year, normalised by firm assets (see the text for more details). A 
significant negative coefficient α3 means that the collateral effects can help firms borrow at a 
lower cost. Lj,t−1 is a vector of proxies for local government j
′s economic conditions which are 
available up to previous year (denoted as [t-1]), including GDPG, defined as one year lag of 
the growth rate of GDP in a given city. The variable FISCAL_PRESS is the local fiscal pressure 
defined as one year lag budgetary expenditure to budgetary revenue in a given city. ZI,t−1 is a 
vector of proxies for firm level financial conditions, including one year lag of log total assets, 
estimated earnings (ROA), and leverage (liability/total assets). The set of bond characteristics 
(Bi) reflect the typical factors that capture differences in bond liquidity such as maturity, total 
amount, and the market where the bond is expected to trade (inter-bank or exchanges). The 
fixed effects include year effect (TJ) and city fixed effects (CJ).  
In equation (2) Yield_spreadi,j,t  is the yield on LGFV bond i  less the yield on the China 
Treasury bond with maturity closest to the LGFV bond i. A potential problem with the raw 
credit ratings in the yield spread regressions is that the credit ratings may have already 
incorporated the information of some of the control variables. To avoid the potential 
multicollinearity problems, I use an estimate of the bond ratings instead of those of the raw 
measurements (Liu et al. 2010; Liu & Jiraporn 2010). Specifically, I estimate a model for credit 
rating with all control variables included in the equation. The error term from this regression 
contains rating information net of the impact of these control variables. I then label the error 
term as the RATING_ RES in the yield spread regressions. 
5.5.1 Land Finance and LGFV Bond Ratings 
One of the most important factors affecting the cost of bond yield is firm’s credit ratings. I 
begin by asking whether credit-rating agencies incorporate the land revenue into their rating 
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results. I run an ordered probit model because the categories of credit ratings convey ordinal 
risk assessments. Given the numerical values assigned to the ratings, a negative coefficient 
would indicate that the variable is associated with lower credit ratings and higher risks.  
Table 5.2 presents the results of how land finance affects LGFVs’ bond ratings. Specifications 
(1) to (6) shows that the coefficients of both LAND_REV and LAND_DEP are statistically 
insignificant. In terms of land collateral channels, specifications (1) to (6) shows that the 
coefficients of both RATIO_REV1 and RATIO_REV2 are statistically insignificant. This 
result indicates that Chinese rating companies did not incorporate land finance and land 
collateral information into their ratings.  
While credit ratings provide little information on land finance, they do take stock of company 
level financial information. For example, ROA is positively correlated with bond ratings at a 
1% significant level, LEVERAGE is negatively correlated with bond ratings at a 5% significant 
level, and ASSETs is positively correlated with bond ratings with 1% significance. Local fiscal 
conditions are also noticed by the rating companies, with GDPG and FISCAL_PRESS being 





Table 5.2 Regression model of bond ratings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RATINGS RATINGS RATINGS RATINGS RATINGS RATINGS 
 OLS Ordered Probit 
LAND_REV 0.057 0.025 0.021 0.054 0.032 0.020 
 (0.073) (0.069) (0.067) (0.066) (0.068) (0.068) 
LAND_DEP 0.014 0.169 0.099 -0.055 0.171 0.108 
 (0.174) (0.159) (0.202) (0.175) (0.173) (0.212) 
RATIO_REV1 0.211 -0.794 -0.803    
 (1.016) (1.073) (1.077)    
RATIO_REV2    2.986 -0.854 -1.143 
    (4.409) (4.972) (4.922) 
LP_YOY -0.022 0.012 -0.002    
 (0.026) (0.037) (0.061)    
HP_YOY    -0.503** 0.026 0.079 
    (0.240) (0.278) (0.279) 
AMOUNT 0.089*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.089*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
MATURITY -0.085*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.084*** -0.032*** -0.031*** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) 
PUBLIC_DUM 0.036 0.037 0.032 0.039 0.036 0.030 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) 
INTBANK_DUM 0.456*** 0.132*** 0.135*** 0.455*** 0.132*** 0.135*** 
 (0.032) (0.029) (0.028) (0.032) (0.029) (0.028) 
ROA  0.145*** 0.143***  0.145*** 0.143*** 
  (0.021) (0.021)  (0.021) (0.022) 
LEVERAGE  -0.002** -0.002**  -0.002** -0.002** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
ASSET  1.418*** 1.420***  1.418*** 1.420*** 
  (0.096) (0.096)  (0.096) (0.095) 
GDPG   -1.331***   -1.333*** 
   (0.508)   (0.506) 
FISCAL_PRESS   0.607**   0.585** 
   (0.260)   (0.248) 
LAND_PRICE   0.070   0.077 
   (0.130)   (0.086) 
Year Dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Province Dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y 
City Rank Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 8619 8619 8602 8619 8619 8602 
R2 or Pseudo R2 0.2285 0.4810 0.4936 0.2285 0.4810 0.4936 
Notes: This table shows results of OLS regression in model (1) to (3) and ordered Probit in model (4) to (6). Significance 
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The standard errors are clustered at the province level and shown in parentheses. 
In summary, although bond characteristics and local economic condition is incorporated into 
their rating system, Chinese credit rating agencies do not incorporate the local land market 
information into their bond ratings.  
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5.5.2 Land Finance and LGFV Bond Yields 
I empirically examine the relation between land finance and yield spread. Table 5.3 displays 
the results of regressions using bond yield spread as the dependent variable. In all models, I 
cluster the standard errors at the city level to ensure robustness to unspecified city correlations.  
Model (1) only includes bond characteristic controls and model (2) based on model (1), adds 
firm’s financial information. Model (3) based on model (2), incorporates the local economic 
information. Model (4) to model (6) substitutes RATIO_REV1 and LP_YOY with 
RATIO_REV2 and HP_YOY, respectively. In all these models, the LAND_REV is negatively 
related to bond yields with coefficients significant at the 5% level and LAND_DEP is 
positively correlated with the yield spread significant at the 1% level. The results are consistent 
with Hypothesis 1 and 2 that the higher land leasing revenue leads to a lower cost of bond and 
the higher dependence of land revenue leads to a higher borrowing cost. 
In terms of land collateral channels, from model (1) to model (3), the RATIO_REV1 registered 
a significant negative sign. In model (4) to model (6) the alternative measurements are used 
and the change in the market value of real estate assets leads to a negative coefficient on the 
yield spread with significant level at 5%, which is consistent with the hypothesis 3. 
The coefficient estimates of other control variables are largely consistent with the literature. 
For example, the greater the fiscal pressure a city was faced with, the higher the borrowing 
costs to the city (Ambrose et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2017). As expected, the coefficient of 
FISCAL_PRESS in model (3) and model (6) show a positive significant sign.  
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Table 5.3 Land finance and LGFV bond yields 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Yield_Spread Yield_Spread Yield_Spread Yield_Spread Yield_Spread Yield_Spread 
LAND_REV -0.097* -0.071* -0.099** -0.085** -0.063** -0.097** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.053) (0.046) (0.045) (0.053) 
LAND_DEP 0.322*** 0.285** 0.288** 0.327*** 0.268** 0.281** 
 (0.112) (0.118) (0.115) (0.117) (0.119) (0.115) 
RATIO_REV1 -1.242** -1.001** -0.978**    
 (0.518) (0.485) (0.487)    
RATIO_REV2    -4.729*** -3.893** -4.082** 
    (1.680) (1.669) (1.749) 
LP_YOY 0.024 0.009 -0.016    
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.039)    
HP_YOY    0.080 -0.092 -0.053 
    (0.195) (0.173) (0.172) 
RATINGS_RES -0.256*** -0.256*** -0.256*** -0.256*** -0.256*** -0.256*** 
 (0.037) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.032) (0.032) 
AMOUNT -0.017*** 0.004 0.004 -0.017*** 0.004 0.004 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
MATURITY -0.014 -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.014 -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
PUBLIC_DUM -0.822*** -0.797*** -0.801*** -0.824*** -0.797*** -0.800*** 
 (0.038) (0.032) (0.031) (0.039) (0.033) (0.032) 
INTBANK_DUM -0.347*** -0.245*** -0.243*** -0.346*** -0.244*** -0.243*** 
 (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) 
ROA  -0.031*** -0.032***  -0.031*** -0.032*** 
  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
LEVERAGE  0.001*** 0.001***  0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
ASSET  -0.305*** -0.305***  -0.306*** -0.306*** 
  (0.023) (0.023)  (0.023) (0.023) 
GDPG   0.214   0.201 
   (0.313)   (0.317) 
FISCAL_PRESS   0.336*   0.337* 
   (0.216)   (0.207) 
LAND_PRICE   0.115   0.103** 
   (0.073)   (0.051) 
CONSTANT 5.759*** 6.713*** 3.355 5.615*** 6.624*** 3.562 
 (0.606) (0.615) (3.594) (0.571) (0.573) (3.590) 
Year Dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y 
City Dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y 
City Rank Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 8602 8602 8602 8604 8604 8604 
R2 0.501 0.545 0.546 0.501 0.545 0.546 
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
The standard errors are clustered at city level.  
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5.5.3 Policy Shocks and Structure Changes 
The landmark policy shock of the 2013-14 debt regulations induced a structural change in the 
LGFV bond market. Document 43 came out in September 2014. The model splits up data into 
before and after 2014 subsamples to test the robustness of the results.  
Table 5.4 presents the land revenue and dependence channel before and after the policy shock. 
The results after 2015 are consistent with those of the full sample. However, results before 
2014 show that both LAND_REV and LAND_DEP are statistically insignificant. This 
difference between two sample periods is consistent with early research conducted by Liu et 
al. (2017) using the sub-sample between 2008 and 2014, which also failed to register any effect 
of land revenue on yield spreads. FISCAL_PRESS also shows similar results. The coefficient 
of FSICAL_PRESS is insignificant before 2015 but becomes positively related after with yield 
spreads at a 1% level of significance. These results suggest that LGFV debt has been 
increasingly viewed by investors as, effectively, a local government obligation.  
Table 5.4 presents the results for land collateral channels before and after the shock. Using land 
as collateral is more robust and consistent than using it as a source of revenue in showing a 
significant negative sign in all the models
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Table 5.4 Regression model of policy structural change 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 YIELD_SPREAD YIELD_SPREAD YIELD_SPREAD YIELD_SPREAD 
 Year<=2014 Year <=2014 Year >=2015 Year >=2015 
LAND_REV 0.08 0.115 -0.150 -0.152** 
 (0.153) (0.113) (0.064) (0.064) 
LAND_DEP 0.08 0.084 0.45** 0.417*** 
 (0.198) (0.218) (0.149) (0.156) 
RATIO_REV1 -9.64***  -1.001**  
 (2.7419)  (0.516)  
RATIO_REV2  -32.68  -3.925** 
  (21.81)  (1.774) 
LP_YOY 0.030  -0.011  
 (0.138)  (0.047)  
HP_YOY  0.804  -0.079** 
  (0.011)  (0.029) 
RATINGS_RES -0.278*** -0.277*** -0.290*** -0.289*** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) 
AMOUNT -0.008 -0.006 0.039 0.037 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.029) (0.029) 
MATURITY -0.406*** -0.408*** 0.011 0.012 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.044) (0.044) 
PUBLIC_DUM -0.745*** -0.743*** -0.832*** -0.831*** 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.032) (0.032) 
INTBANK_DUM -0.271*** -0.272*** -0.129*** -0.129*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) 
ROA -0.016** -0.017** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
LEVERAGE 0.001 0.001 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ASSET -0.133*** -0.136*** -0.101*** -0.101*** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.024) (0.023) 
GDPG 1.265 1.104 0.700 0.587 
 (0.865) (0.882) (0.514) (0.530) 
FISCAL_PRESS -0.441 -0.580 0.815*** 0.829*** 
 (0.491) (0.478) (0.229) (0.234) 
Year Dummy Y Y Y Y 
City Dummy Y Y Y Y 
City Dummy Y Y Y Y 
_cons -10.355 -7.949 -3.516 -1.751 
 (9.753) (9.984) (6.480) (6.670) 
N 3329 3329 5157 5157 
R2 0.384 0.383 0.502 0.502 
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
The standard errors are clustered at city level.  
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5.6 Policy Implication and Discussion  
This chapter shows that the land market plays an important role in determining LGFVs’ 
borrowing costs. A booming local land market can lower LGFVs’ borrowing costs via two 
channels: it can strengthen (1) local governments’ fiscal position and lend more credence to its 
implicit guarantee for LGFV bonds, and (2) LGFV balance sheets by inflating the value of land 
assets held in those vehicles. However, LGFVs’ land revenue, especially from revenues, can 
be lumpy; and some local governments’ notionally commercial firms may be located in regions 
where too heavy a reliance on land revenue would impose onerous borrowing costs.  
Three dimensions of policy implication can be inferred from the study’s results. First, it would 
seem the case that Chinese rating agencies fail to capture different local governments’ degree 
of dependence on land finance in their rating models. This neglect makes it difficult for bond 
investors to identify and measure the risks associated with LGFVs. For local governments, it 
is desirable to have a strong base with a balance of land and other tax revenue; however, 
administrations which have achieved this balance do not necessarily enjoy higher ratings on 
their debt, in comparison with their counterparts who lack the same budgetary discipline. There 
is a need for Chinese rating agencies to re-calibrate their rating models and improve their rating 
results. Local governments and LGFVs with an efficient land finance strategy deserve strong 
credit ratings and should be in a position to seek the best terms on bonds and loans from the 
financial market. This may help reduce the costs of intermediation and thereby finance urban 
infrastructure more economically. 
Second, this chapter’s results suggest that China’s political arrangements have the potential to 
balance some of the risks of LGFV debt. Currently, due to the incentives offered to officials 
chasing promotion, politicians’ tenure limits and mandatory retirement ages affect local 
governments’ land leasing strategy (Cai et al. 2017; Chen et al. 2017b) which makes most of 
local governments’ land leasing strategy short-sighted. The effect is to make most of local 
leasing strategies short-term oriented. The negative relationship between local governments’ 
reliance on land leasing revenue and LGFV bond yields represents a violation of central and 
local governments’ monotonous target—of maximising revenue. Having a broader range of 
development targets would make land leasing strategies more sustainable. From the point of 
view of the sustainability of local debt, the long-term risks of over-reliance on land leasing 
possibly outweigh the short-term benefits of selling large amounts of land. In formulating 
development policies, local governments should consider debt sustainability and land use 
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efficiency: land leasing revenue can supplement the government fiscal shortfalls, without 
officials selling land use rights too aggressively15. Study findings have shown that China’s land 
and debt market are inter-connected, which suggests that central and local governments should 
not regulate house prices too closely, since artificial ceilings (for instance) could pose a threat 
to local governments’ fiscal revenue and hence financial stability.  
Third, the results in section 5.5.3 show that local governments’ fiscal revenue, land leasing 
revenue, and degree of reliance on land-related revenue have become the determinants of 
LGFV bond yield since 2015 when the central government issued the No.43 document. These 
results reveal that the No.43 Document successfully ‘hardened budgetary constraints’ making 
investors believe that local governments, rather than the central government, bore bailout 
responsibility for their LGFV debt. Results suggest the ambiguity over whether LGFV was 
backed by local governments, was cleared up. In the future, it may be necessary for the central 
government to impose fiscal rules and set LGFV debt limits for local governments. At the same 
time, local governments should propose their own debt issuance or budgetary plans when 
tapping the financial market to demonstrate the soundness of their development projections.   
5.7 Conclusions 
Academia has yet to fully to grasp the relationship between the Chinese land market and the 
yield spread of LGFVs. Using the latest dataset, this chapter has offered empirical evidence 
suggesting that investors factor in the strength of implicit local government support of their 
LGFVs, insofar as a positive relationship holds between cities’ land revenue and the cost of 
their newly issued LGFV bond. A negative relationship holds, however, between governments’ 
land revenue dependence and their yield spread. Further, a booming land and housing market 
can lower the cost of bonds through appreciating housing assets in LGFV portfolios being 
understood as collateral supporting their debt.  
The study has enhanced our understanding of the dynamic relationship between municipal debt 
borrowing costs and land finance in China. The findings are of great importance for bond 
investors in their assessment of their exposure to the credit risks on LGFV bonds. This 
contribution can help investors better understand the determinants of LGFVs’ bonds yield, and 
 
15 Note that I only model the relationship between land finance, dependence on land revenue and the cost of a 




their spread over Treasury benchmarks, as these derive from a series of local economic, fiscal, 
and political factors. In the meantime, the results this study has generated can help local 
governments improve their financial soundness and lower their financing costs.  
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Chapter 6  
Summary and Conclusions 
China’s urbanisation has been generally successful at mobilising resources and providing the 
infrastructure that cities need to grow the country’s economy. However, the local budget 
system faces substantial financing challenges. While China’s political arrangements offer local 
officials’ incentives to urbanise China, its fiscal institutions (or the division of taxing and 
spending powers between central and local governments) place heavy financing burdens on 
cities. In consequence, local governments have put land and debt finance at the centre of their 
plans to invest in infrastructure. By reviewing some recent political changes in the context of 
the literature dealing with China’s urbanisation, this thesis has identified three major problems 
with China’s urbanisation financing model. Pertinent questions arise: first, how local 
governments use debt to finance infrastructure construction; second, how the local land market 
affects LGFV bond yields; and third, how corruption locally affects firms’ (including LGFVs’) 
borrowing costs. The answers to these questions are of great importance to China’s future 
policy making on urbanisation. In Section 7.1, I present the main findings to these questions 
and state how the work has contributed to knowledge. The final discussion in Section 7.2 is of 
this work’s limitations and of the future research directions it suggests.  
6.1 Key Findings and Contributions 
Chapter 2 presents the thesis’ background information, conducted through a literature review. 
The work then builds on factors identified by this research to put together a model of the 
complex relationship between the different roles of land, fiscal, and political structure in 
China’s urbanisation. The thesis’ conceptual framework acknowledges that there are problems 
associated with the financing of China’s urban development. The framework in Section 2.3 
helps us better understand the main drivers of urbanisation and the most widely used practical 
means of financing it. Urbanisation proceeds according to a closed feedback loop in which 
local governments are incentivised to pursue urbanisation for fiscal and political purposes and 
finally rewarded by a larger tax base, economic growth, and political promotion. However, 
three major problems with this ‘virtuous cycle’ conception of growth are identified: 1) local 
governments may finance urban infrastructure by over-relying on land finance; 2) LGFVs’ 
borrowing costs are priced by the market; it may either make borrowing unaffordable or 
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systemically misprice risks, threatening large-scale market failure, and 3) corruption (or 
perceptions of corruption) may warp firms’ borrowing costs.  
In Chapter 3, I discuss two competing theories explaining local governments’ incentives: a 
Regional Tournament Competition (RTC) thesis and a Fiscal Federalism (FF) thesis. Both 
theories have limitations that stem from the complexity of local government behaviours in land 
conversion and urbanisation. In reviewing the literature, I find the Fiscal Federalism (FF) 
model overall provides a better description of the land development decisions taken by local 
government officials.  
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by responding to the call for studies on infrastructure 
financing in the Global South (O'Brien et al. 2019; Whiteside 2019). This is one of the few 
investigations into alternative funding and financing models of infrastructure projects in China 
(Tan & Zhao 2019). On the policy front, this study’s findings provide timely assessment of 
how well the ‘iron hand’ of the central government and the ‘visible hand’ of local governments 
are working together on infrastructure provisions. In May 2020, the Chinese government 
announced its new development strategy in the latest five-year plan: the Dual Circulation 
strategy. It is a new balance away from global integration (i.e. the first circulation) and towards 
increased domestic reliance (i.e. the second circulation) (Blanchette & Polk 2020). Such a 
strategy helps local governments collect more revenue from land leasing to fund infrastructure 
projects (He et al. 2014). Correspondingly, infrastructure development decisions should be 
more responsive to demand from domestic markets (Buckley 2020). The findings suggest that 
the reforms of local government debt markets in the last decade has paved the road for this 
transition. 
Chapter 5 contributes to scholarly understanding in modelling the relationship between LGFV 
bond yields and the local land market. Empirical results reveal that local land leasing revenues 
are associated with lower LGFV bond yields, while a higher share of land finance in cities’ 
fiscal revenue tends to push up LGFV bond yields. The study also found a negative relationship 
for a so-called land asset collateral channel: increases in local land and house prices depress 
LGFV borrowing costs, thanks to appreciation in the market values of land assets held by 
LGFVs. These findings fill a knowledge gap in how the land market and local governments’ 
use of land finance determines LGFV bond yields. This chapter considers three applicable 
factors that the bond investors should consider when buying LGFV bonds. It also provides 
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useful suggestions for government’s land policy and for institutional reforms of local 
government debt management.  
Overall, the findings of this thesis fit well with a theory of Chinese fiscal federalism (FF). 
Chapter 4 sets out to enhance the explanatory power of the FF thesis by adapting it to the 
circumstances of a new era. It shows that Chinese local governments use LGFV debt to finance 
infrastructure for commercial land development. Results reveal that the central government’s 
Dual Circulation Strategy shifts a large part of economic development from exports to domestic 
consumption. Chapter 5 verifies the thesis’ hard budget constraint for China, providing 
evidence that Chinese local governments borrow on the understanding that their future revenue 
will pay back bondholders’ claims. 
6.2 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
This thesis has several limitations. The findings discussed in Chapter 4, while consistent with 
the hypothesis, pertain only to the city level. A more comprehensive study could use county 
level data since there are more than 2,000 counties in China, many of whose local governments 
issue debt. This more close-grained analysis would provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of Chinese local governments’ financing strategy. Second, the work uses 
accounting data of LGFVs’ cash outflow to proxy infrastructural investment, which fails to 
quantify the specific type of investment city governments are making. If it were possible to 
classify types of infrastructure investment, we could understand the role of infrastructure in the 
economy in a more meaningful way. Third, an experimental study might do better at evaluating 
the effects of the 2014 policy change on LGFVs’ borrowing behaviour, possibly verifying a 
causal relationship. However, due to the difficulty of finding an appropriate control group, a 
DID (difference in difference) research method is not applicable. In the future, as more data 
becomes available and more stringent policies are issued, research will be able to draw on 
larger samples and use data for sharper policy shocks in testing the relationship between LGFV 
debt and infrastructure financing.   
Chapter 5 explores the relationship between LGFVs’ borrowing costs and the local land market. 
One major concern is the endogeneity associated with LGFV bond yields in their relation to 
land finance. While the study uses a lagged term for independent variables to alleviate this 
endogeneity problem, it is still reasonable to suspect that land finance and LGFV bond yields 
have a long-term relationship, which might induce a reverse-causality problem (potentially 
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leading to bias). Using an IV (instrumental variable) approach could possibly address this 
concern. The basic strategy would be to find an instrument for land revenue using the 
interaction of a demand shifter with a fixed supply. I use an interaction term between a national 
interest rate with the measure of land slope in a city to construct an IV; the underlying logic is 
that changes in demand will lead to price changes if the local supply of land is inelastic (Chen 
& Kung 2016). However, the results could not pass the weak-identification (F-test) tests.  
Lastly, although this thesis sheds light on two particular risks that threaten the orderly financing 
of China’s urbanisation, further research on other aspects of urbanisation is urgently required. 
This thesis has examined China’s political arrangements and market for local government debt 
and opens the way to a fuller consideration of policy-oriented questions. For example, 
academic work could consider how to improve the intergovernmental grants system and match 
local governments’ expenditure (over different periods) with their revenues. The Chinese 
government is concerned with preserving national food security while continuing urbanisation 
and expanding the urban area. It has an interest in reforming the land system to ensure local 
governments use land more efficiently. How China meets these challenges is crucial to its 
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